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• BEACON OR LOOKOUT
I WALLED CITY ° FORTIFIED PLACE
1 TOWN OR VILLAGE X POLICE OFFICE
HU TSUNG-HSIENTS CAMPAIGN AGAINST HSU HAI, 1556
In the spring and summer of 1556 a renegade Chinese named
Hstf Esdjfy^led an invading group of Japanese and Chinese on a
plundering foray through the northeastern sector of Chekiang province.
Opposing them was a military establishment that for years past had
been battered by coastal raiders, now under the control of an ambitious
and clever civil official named Hu Tsung-hsien t%*£% . In 1556 the
raiders besieged cities and ravaged the countryside, defeated and
terrorized the government soldiery in a series of skirmishes and
battles, and accumulated booty and captives. Hu Tsung-hsien resort-
ed to guile more than to force, turned the marauding leaders against
one another, baited them with bribes and promises, and finally cleared
the area of them. The campaign was not one of the most consequential
in China's military history, even during the Mng dynasty (1368-1644).
But it was famous and well reported in its time, and it illustrates some
of the unusual ways in which the Chinese of the imperial age coped with
the often unusual military problems they faced.
1. The Nature of the Military Problem
Traditional Chinese patterns of response to military threats.
Over the preceding centuries the Chinese had grown accustomed to
three major kinds of military challenges: Q) domestic disturbances
created by discontented subjects, which at their strongest threatened
and sometimes achieved changes of dynasties; (2) probing raids or
occasional massive invasions of highly mobile northern nomadic peoples;
and (3) resistance of southern and southwestern aboriginal tribesmen to
the steady spread of Chinese settlement and sociopolitical organization.
Against these potential challenges, both from within and from without,
Chinese governments had come to put great faith in the suppressive
influence of the awesome air of moral superiority that emanated from
their sprawling civil officialdom. But behind the facade of self-right-
eous gentility there always were large armies in walled garrisons
strung behind the Great Wall across northernmost China or spotted
elsewhere at strategic points along important water and land routes.
In face of all dangers, Chinese government policy fluctuated between
two types of actions: (L) military initiatives to break up threatening
confederations, to seize natural staging areas, or to keep the enemy
off balance by shows of force; and on the other hand (2) diplomatic
initiatives to mollify, threaten, cajole, confuse, or distract the enemy
so that ChinaTs security was not likely to be endangered.
When hostilities erupted, whether on the frontiers or in the
interior, the government traditionally considered two possible
responses: (I) a straightforward military solution, called "extermi-
nation" (chiao ffi [or mi eh >$,); or (2) an indirect politico-economic
solution, called "pacification" (chao-an^J^- , chao-fu^jjfe or similar
terms suggesting "summoning and appeasing"), supported by real, but
muted, threats of military action. In their pragmatic way, Chinese
officials seem normally to have considered direct military solutions
suitable only in the last resort, when the nation's vital interests were
at stake and pacification was impossible or would yield unacceptable
results. Except in the cases of notoriously bellicose Chinese leaders,
pacification seems to have been greatly preferred as the normal means
of coping with the disaffected. This preference no doubt reflects
Chinese inclinations within the family and local community to "keep
things going" at almost all costs, by mediating, compromising, and
saving face all around.
The unprecedented challenge of Japan-based raiders. The
Japanese were the first people who posed threats to China's security
from non-contiguous territory. 1 Beginning in the early part of the
thirteenth century, Japanese groups began raiding Korea; and after
Khubilai Khan's unsuccessful punitive invasions of Kyushu in 1274 and
1281, they extended their raids to the coastal sectors of China. Strenu-
ous diplomatic and defensive efforts by the early Ming emperors
diminished the impact of these raids and channeled Sino-Japanese
contacts into tribute-missions that were acceptable in the Chinese view
of how foreign people should behave. But in 1548, following a series of
disturbing tribute-mission incidents, these formal contacts were term-
inated. 2 Even before that time coastal raiding had been resumed on
an ever increasing scale, and it reached and passed its peak in the
1550's. (This happened to be just the time when West European coasts,
and especially shipping lanes, were being similarly harassed by
marauders from the Barbary Coast of Africa.)
China* s efforts to cope with these coastal marauders were
complicated by several factors:
Q.) There was the practical difficulty of trying to mount and
maintain an adequate military defense along the entirety of China's
long coastline. 3 The Ming rulers attempted to create a coastal
equivalent of the Great Wall by establishing a line of walled cities,
small forts, stockades, watchtowers, and beacon mounds along the
whole coast from Korea to Annam. Moreover, they maintained naval
fleets that were supposed to patrol the estuaries, coves, inlets, and
offshore islands that abound south of the Yangtze River delta. Since
Ming naval ships were superior to the vessels used by the marauders
and were normally victorious in open sea battles, Ming authorities
realized it was better to catch raiders at sea than to track them down
once they were ashore. But there was little confidence that even a
strong coastal fleet would in itself guarantee security. To catch
marauders fleeing outward laden with booty was one thing; to anticipate
and fend off those who were approaching was another. However well
defended, the China coast was extraordinarily vulnerable to raiding
attacks.
(2) Denying the marauders their bases and staging areas would
have required Chinese conquest and control of the Liu-chTiu Islands,
Taiwan, and even part of Japan itself. Early in the Ming dynasty,
when the famous eunuch admiral Cheng Ho led huge armadas across
the Indian Ocean, the establishing of an overseas Chinese empire
might have seemed possible. Both TTai-tsu (1368-1398) and Ch!eng-tsu
(1402-1424) at least tried to intimidate Japan with threats of invasion.4
But even these early Ming emperors were not foolhardy enough to carry
out such threats, and later emperors had been so concerned about
possible troubles in the north that they had allowed Chinese seapower
to decline; so that no one could have suggested def ense-by-conquest
for serious consideration in the 1550Ts.5 At the very time when
Southeast China was most harassed by sea marauders, the attention of
the court was particularly riveted upon the northern frontier, where
Mongol power revitalized under ALtan Khan was looming as the most
serious military challenge China had faced in more than a century. 6
In 1550 Altan Khan plundered into the very environs of Peking, and
thereafter until 1570 there were recurring alarms in North China and
extraordinary expenditures to shore up the northern defenses. The
1550fs consequently were not a time for risky adventurings of any sort
in other areas.
(3) Moreover, the coastal marauding was by no means solely
a problem in foreign relations. The marauders were generally called
Wo-kTou j ^ j^l (Japanese Wako), MJapanese raiders, " and it was the
Japanese who had begun the raiding. But the Wako were never agents
of any organized Japanese government, and in the sixteenth century
(during most of which no effective central government existed in Japan)
raiding groups on the China coast generally included only small pro-
portions of adventuresome Japanese warriors. Even these were most-
ly led by Chinese renegades, and they were supported by other Chinese
renegades, offshore islanders, footloose mainlanders looking for pro-
fitable adventures, and sometimes, apparently, Portuguese and their
Malaysian hangers-on. By the 1550Ts, what the Chinese government
called Wo-kTou constituted an international fraternity combining
smugglers who had now been badgered into marauding and their main-
land collaborators, who even included persons of considerable local
and perhaps more far-reaching reputation and influence. The raiders
knew local conditions on the mainland, had excellent contacts in the
cities and towns, and were no doubt befriended and guided by local re-
sidents as effectively as were the government troops arrayed against
them. In short, there was no clear cut division between invading
"barbarians" on the one hand and a united local citizenry on the other.
As in the modern suppression of guerrilla insurgents, it was difficult
to plan for a decisive, direct military solution.
(4) The wealth and accessibility of the threatened area in the
1550's further complicated the problem. The focal area of Wako attack
in this period, the region traditionally called Chiang-nan ("South of the
River") or Tung-nan ("the southeast"), including the Shanghai-Soochow
portion of modern Kiangsu Province and the Hangchow-Ningpo portion
of Chekiang Province, has always been of strategic importance in
Chinafs inter-regional and international relations. From T'ang and
Sung times on, Ningpo and Hangchow had been centers of international
trade, and in the early sixteenth century Ningpo was a center of
Portuguese activity in China. Eventually the sector became an impor-
tant focus of British attention in the nineteenth-century Opium War,
when Chou-shan (Chusan) Island off Ningpo served as a major British
naval station, from which the British captured Ningpo, its guardian
city Ting-hai, and the excellent harbor of Cha-pfu near the northern
border of Chekiang. Ningpo and Shanghai were among the first treaty
ports opened to the Modern West; and Shanghai, of course, rapidly
became modern China's busiest port and most populous city.
This southeast China region was a natural target for the marau-
ders of Ming times. Prevailing winds make it an easy voyage from Japan
to Chekiang in spring and autumn. The region is a plain crisscrossed by
waterways that make it easily penetrable by boats, and there are
innumerable excellent anchorages on its coast. It is (and in Ming
times was even more so) a densely populated region, intensively
cultivated and highly productive of both agricultural and manufactured
goods, inhabited by many rich and cultured families. In Ming times
it was the breadbasket from which grain taxes were shipped along the
Grand Canal from Hangchow northward to the capital at Peking and on
to the northern frontiers. For sixteenth-century marauders, it was
easy of access and bloated with potential plunder.
Military defense in the southeast through 1555. This whole re-
gion had been repeatedly victimized by marauders through the 1540?s,
and the defense organization was therefore steadily strengthened. ' In
1547 a Grand Coordinator (hstm-fu) had been assigned to Chekiang Pro-
vince for the first time, with special jurisdiction over military matters
in the province and in the coastal prefectures of Fukien province to the
south. In 1554, after Hangchow prefecture had been seriously despoiled,
there was created in addition the post of Supreme Commander (tsung-tu)
of Nan Chihli (modern Kiangsu and Anhwei provinces), Chekiang, and
Fukien, which placed in one man's hands the responsibility of super-
vising defense against marauders throughout the whole southeastern
coastal sector. In the early 1550Ts many inland cities and towns of the
region, after being ravaged or threatened, were walled for the first
time in history. To supplement the regular and militia forces of the
area, troops from distant parts of China were deployed into the South-
east, despite the concurrent drainage of troops from ChinaTs interior
to the northern frontier. 9 In 1555, as the military situation steadily
deteriorated, the court at Peking deputed the high-ranking Minister of
Works Chao Wen-hua4$&lf (chin-shih 1529)™ as a special Inspector
of the Armies in the Southeast. Soon the Supreme Commander Chang
Ching$| *jc (chin-shih 1517)** was arrested and sentenced to death.
Grand Coordinator Chou Yun;|] j £ (chin-shih 1532)12 of the Nanking
area became the new Supreme Commander. After only one month in
office Chou Yun was dismissed, along with the Chekiang Grand
Coordinator Li TTien-chTung-|- A - | | (chin-shih 1538; later executed
together with Chand Ching). *3 The Vice Minister of Revenues at
Nanking, Yang I ;£| J[ (chin-shih 1523),^ became the third Supreme
Commander of the year; and Hu Tsung-hsien, then the Censorate!s
low-ranking Regional Inspector of Chekiang, was given an extraordinary
promotion to succeed Li T!ien-chTung as ChekiangTs Grand Coordinator.
Yang I was in turn dismissed in the second month of 1556, whereupon
Hu Tsung-hsien was made Supreme Commander. His former post as
Chekiang Grand Coordinator was soon filled by YUan O$,fi|(1509-1567),15
who had previously served as Education Ihtendant (tTi-tu fu-shih) in the
province. By this time Inspector of the Armies Chao Wen-hua, after
less than a year in the field, had returned to Peking full of assurances
that the situation was at last under control.
By any reckoning, 1555 had been the most disastrous year in the
long history of marauding in the Southeast. Of Chekiang's eleven
prefectures, only the three farthest inland — Chin-hua centrally
located, Chf(I-chou in the far west bordering on Kiangsi province, and
Ch?u-chou in the far southwest north of Fukien province — seem to
have been unscathed during the year. All of the six coastal prefectures—
from north to south: Chia-hsing, Hangchow, Shao-hsing, Ningpo,
T'ai-chou, and Wen-chou—were violated, as were the two inland
prefectures of Yen-chou southwest of Hangchow and Hu-chou northwest
of Hangchow. The inland city of ChTung-te in Chia-hsing prefecture was
occupied and looted. Fukien to the south, the Shanghai-Soochow
region to the north, and even the north shore of the Yangtze River
estuary were harassed. One group of bandits plundered westward up
thiough inland Anhwei province to the very outskirts of Nanking, the
Ming dynasty1 s auxiliary capital and a place of both strategic and
symbolic importance.
Government forces had not been idle in the face of all this raiding
activity in 1555, but they were not dramatically effective except in a
few instances. The most successful government action was a sub-
stantial victory at Wang-chiang-ching in northernmost Chekiang in the
fifth month of the year, when raiders from a coastal base at Che-lin
(north of Chin-shan Guard in Nan Chihli) were waylaid and slaughtered
by a force under the ill-fated Supreme Commander Chang Ching, who
was so soon to be executed for his failures. More than 1, 900 marauders
were reportedly beheaded in this action, thanks primarily to the
utilization of newly-arrived aboriginal troops from Pao-ching and Yung-
shun in the far northwestern sector of modern Hunan province, and
thanks also to the leadership of veteran coast-defense generals such as
Lu TTangJ;!f and Yd Ta-yu^/^(l503-1579).17
Marauding operations of 1555 in the crucial Soochow-Hangchow area
were largely led by Hstt Hal, and it was his main force that suffered
heavily at Wang-chiang-ching. Hsli had been a Chinese Buddhist monk
originally associated with the ancient and famous Tiger Haunt Monastery
(Hu-pTao ssu) outside Hangehow. Contemporaries often identified him
by his Buddhist appellation, Ming-shan Ho-shang 9fl*fajs). How and
when he became disaffected is not clear, but he seems to have won the
respect of the marauders with his skills at divination and prognostica-
tion; they liked to call him r'Generalissimo Commissioned by Heaven
to Pacify the Oceans" (TTien-chTai pTing-hai ta chiang-chtln). By the
early 1550Ts he had reportedly become an associate of the most
influential of all the marauder chiefs, another Chinese renegade named
Wang Chihi j | , the so-called "King of the Wako" ensconced in the Goto
archipelago off Kyushu. HstTs base was the Satsuma realm in southern-
most Kyushu, and his main force consisted of Japanese from Satsuma
and nearby realms including Izumi and Hizen. His exploits of 1555
established him as a marauder chief of the first magnitude.
2. Hu Tsung-hsien; His Problems and Policies
Hu Tsung-hsien, who assumed responsibility for defense against
the raiders in early 1556, was a native of Hui-chou prefecture in Anhwei
province and a metropolitan examination graduate (chin-shih)of 1538. *9
He had served in two county magistracies in turn and had then been
promoted to a post as investigating censor in the Censorate at Peking.
After one censorial tour as regional inspector of the Hsiian-ta northern
defense frontier, he appeared in Chekiang in 1554 in a similar role. He
immediately became embroiled in the defense problems of the area and
very quickly, as has been noted, rose to the exalted position of Supreme
Commander.
Hu Tsung-hsien is generally described as a clever and ambitious
man. From the first, his service in Chekiang got him involved in
political relationships that were easily interpreted as opportunism on
his part, which made him a highly controversial figure both in his own
time and in the judgment of later historians. The times were complicat-
ed and the careers of all officials were difficult. The reigning emperor,
Shih-tsung (1521-1566), got at odds with the officialdom at the outset of
his reign in a famous "Rites Controversy" and had repeatedly shown
inclinations to be cruel, capricious, and irrational. In the 1550Ts he
was devoting himself to exotic Taoist exercises and leaving adminis-
tration largely in the hands of his senior Grand Secretary, Yen Sung Jq^
(1480-1565). 20 From 1542 to 1562 Yen Sung dominated the central
government with the assistance of his notoriously corrupt son, Yen
Shih-fan^ -f % (1513-1565); he has been held in contempt ever since as
a sycophantic, venal, and very self-seeking political manipulator.
Whether this judgment is fair or not, it was a fact of life in the 1550Ts
that one could accomplish little in government without enjoying the
favor of the Yens and helping to line their pockets.
Inspector of the Armies Chao Wen-hua appeared in Chekiang in
1555 as a protege of Yen Sung, so arrogant and avaricious that he was
probably more a hindrance than a help in the defense effort. Supreme
Commander Chang Ching and Grand Coordinator l i TTien-chfung were
not appropriately deferential to Chao, to their ultimate undoing. But
Hu Tsung-hsien found (indeed, probably sought) favor with Chao and,
through Chao, with the Yens; hence he prospered. His power position,
however, was necessarily precarious. There were critics ready to
pounce on him at any opportunity and on any pretext simply because of
his association with Chao and the Yens; and pretexts were not hard to
find, whatever the military situation, because Hu could not survive
without "squeezing" his subordinates and the citizenry at large to
maintain a satisfactory flow of "gifts" to his patrons.
Thus the problems that Hu Tsung-hsien confronted in early 1556,
when Hstt Hai and Ms marauders reappeared in force, were multi-
faceted. He was very vulnerable to criticism for any mistake, as the
rapid turnover of his Supreme Commander predecessors made clear.
To avert personal disaster threatened by potential critics at court, he
must retain the good will of the Yens. To accomplish this, he must
avert military disaster; and to accomplish that, given the record of
successive disasters in prior years, he must be very clever indeed.
A resounding "extermination" of the marauders in a straightforward
military solution, however eagerly the government and the citizenry
alike might yearn for one, had repeatedly proved elusive even when
massive defense forces were assembled in the beleaguered Southeast
from far distant regions of China, "Pacification, " on the other hand,
was not sure of acceptance either by the marauders or by the court.
On the northern frontier Altan Khan apparently could have been appeas-
ed from the first, as he was eventually, by the regularization of
frontier trading opportunities for the Mongols; but the court in the 1550Ts
was adamantly opposed to this. In the Southeast, the courtTs denial of
regularized trading opportunities to outsiders was the root of all the
coastal troubles; and the preeminent marauder chief, Wang Chih,
apparently could have been appeased at any time by a reversal of the
court!s policy and amnesty for those who had violated it. Hstt Hai, for
his part, seems to have been quite content with the existing situation,
which had apparently yielded him enormous booty in 1555. He was not
so likely to find any advantage in such terms even if they could be
offered. Thus, although pacification tactics short of open-trade
appeasement had been proposed and tentatively authorized as early as
mid-1554, 2l such measures could be undertaken only at considerable
risk.
There were at least three major risks: (I) Trying to "pacify"
marauders, without enough military strength to fall back on, could
expose the Southeast to military disaster. (2) "Pacification" attempts
that proved less than wholly successful could expose Hu Tsung-hsien to
charges of "giving free rein to bandits," which had already ruined some
careers. (3) A determined "pacification" policy could further de-
moralize already badly demoralized subordinates, who consistently
seemed convinced, no matter how disastrous the last battle had been,
that the next battle would be a decisive victory. Hu Tsung-hsien1 s
immediate civil-service subordinate, Grand Coordinator Yttan O, and
his highest-ranking military-service subordinate, the Chekiang
Regional Commander Ytt Ta-yu, were particularly vocal arguers
against appeasement. 22
Despite all these recognized risks, Hu Tsung-hsien in 1555, while
stall Grand Coordinator, had persuaded his patron Chao Wen-hua that
marauding could not be terminated by direct military means. On the
pretext of spying on the marauders' bases in Japan and enlisting the
cooperation of the Japanese authorities in marauder-suppression, he
had dispatched a mission to the Goto archipelago to initiate negotiations
with Wang Chih. The consequence of these negotiations is another
important and intriguing story in itself, which culminated in Wang
ChihTs surrendering himself at Ningpo late in 1557. 23 what is
immediately relevant here is the fact that Hu Tsung-hsien, throughout
his 1556 campaign against Hstt Hai, was conducting negotiations with
Wang Chih, using them to advantage in his dealings with Hstt Hai,
trying to keep Wang Chih ignorant of the governments real intentions,
and trying simultaneously to keep the court ignorant of promises he was
making to Wang Chih. As events proved, Hu was an adept confidence
man.
Before Hstt HaiTs descent upon the Southeast in 1556, one of Hu
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Tsung-hsienTs envoys to Wang Chih had already returned from Goto
accompanied by several raider chiefs, among whom was particularly
included WangTs godson and intimate confidant, a Ningpo man known
confusedly by the two names Wang Aoi;J£and Mao Hai-feng^^jSC .
HuTs other envoys to Japan remained there more or less as Wang ChihTs
hostages; the formal excuse was that Japan was fragmented without a
single ruler, so that Hu Tsung-hsienTs proclamation to "the King of
Japan" about marauder-suppression had to be taken slowly round to the
regional lords in turn, Hu earnestly entertained WangAo in an effort
to convince Wang Chih of his own sincerity, while the court was demand-
ing that Wang Ao engage in some active marauder-suppression on his
own part so as to demonstrate Wang Chih!s good faith.
When Wang Ao made contact with Hu Tsung-hsien in Chekiang,
probably very early in 1556, he reported (apparently with expressions
of regret that Wang Chih could do nothing about the matter) that Hstt
Hai and his Satsuma followers were preparing to strike the Southeast
once more. In the second or third lunar month of the new year Hs(l
Hai did indeed land in the Cha-pTu region. From then until the eighth
month of the year Hu Tsung-hsien was principally occupied with the
immediate need to suppress Hsli Hai, even though dealing with Wang
Chih and coping with Wako challenges elsewhere in his jurisdiction
could not long be out of his thoughts.
Defense forces available in Che-hsi. The campaign against Hsil
Hai stretched across the sector traditionally called Che-hsi, that
portion of Chekiang that lies north of Hangchow and Hangchow Bay. The
human resources that were available to Hu Tsung-hsien in that sector
at the time can be considered in three categories of personnel:
Q) The first of these categories principally included the civil
service officialdom of what might be called the normal administration.
These were the prefects and prefectural staffs of Hangchow prefecture,
of Hu-chou prefecture inland to the north, and especially of Chia-hsing
prefecture to the northeast, which was the main theater of action; the
magistrates of Chia-hsing prefectures seven counties; the provincial-
level executive officials of the Provincial Administration Office, the
Provincial Surveillance Office, and the Chekiang Regional Military
Commission; the Chekiang Regional Inspector delegated from the
Censorate in Peking; and the Chekiang Grand Coordinator, equivalent
to a provincial governor. The prefects and county magistrates had
11
residual responsibility for local defense and for this purpose maintain-
ed local militia forces; and both the Regional Inspector and the Grand
Coordinator had supervisory responsibilities concerning military
affairs in the province.
(2) The Chekiang Regional Military Commission had administrative
control over the regular military establishment of the province. 24 in
the Che-hsi sector this permanent establishment of hereditary officers
and soldiers included headquarters garrisons of three units of Guards
(wei): Hangchow Front Guard and Hangchow Rear Guard, both with
headquarters in Hangchow city, and Hai-ning Guard with headquarters
at Hai-yen county seat on the northeastern coast. Theoretically, each
such Guard comprised 5,600 hereditary regular troops and twenty-nine
officers of the hereditary military service. But by the middle of the
sixteenth century all Guards were notoriously understaffed. Moreover,
the Guard troops were actually deployed in fragments. Near-contem-
porary sources suggest that the normal complement of troops at Hai-
yen, for example, was 1, 240. Battalion (so) units of undeterminable
strength, subordinate to the Hai-yen headquarters, were in flanking
walled garrisons to the south at Kan-pTu harbor and to the north at
Cha-pTu harbor. Another Battalion unit, detached from the Hangchow
Guards, was regularly stationed within the walls of Hai-ning county
seat between Hangchow and Kan-pTu. Other Guard troops, reportedly
in normal units of seventy, were assigned to each of six Police Offices
(Hsiin-chien ssu) that were maintained in fortified places along the
coast by the civil service authorities of Hangchow and Chia-hsing
prefectures. * Yet other Guard troops must have been on detached
duty, in small platoons or squads, staffing other fortifications and
lookout stations that dotted the coast. One small fort was in the
environs of Hangchow city; there were five more clustered around
Kan-pTu, two near Hai-yen, and thirteen clustered between Cha-pTu
and ChekiangTs northeastern border. Lookout stations were more
evenly scattered: six between Hangchow and Hai-ning, five between
Hai-yen and Cha-pTu, and nine between Cha-pTu and the northeastern
border. Manning the wall s and yamens of inland cities and towns
must have drained off still other regular troops from the Guard
garrisons. Even supposing that the three Guards in the Che-hsi sector
were near normal strength, so that ten or twelve thousand regular
troops were in the sector, the large majority of them — and of the
irregular militia forces as well — must have been immobilized in
these positional defense assignments, which could not safely be
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abandoned. The number of troops who were normally available as a
mobile reserve must have been a relatively small proportion of the
total. Moreover, it is clear that the hereditary regular troops of the
Guards had long since deteriorated in quality to the point where they
could hardly be relied on even for positional defense. For the pursuit
and destruction of invading marauders, special forces were customarily
raised. 2?
(3) The third category of personnel available in Che-hsi might
appropriately be called the active tactical force. 28 it included civil
officials, military officers, and irregular troops. The Grand Coordi-
nator and Regional Inspector of the province perhaps should be thought
of as belonging to this tactical group more than to the normal admin-
istrative hierarchy of the province. More particularly, one Vice
Commissioner (fu-shih) of the Provincial Surveillance Office was
specially assigned as circuit intendant of a Military Defense Circuit
(Hng-pei tao) covering Chia-hsing and Hu-chou prefectures, with
concentrated supervisory responsibility for all military matters in the
Che-hsi sector. The Che-hsi tactical group of military officers — who
had rank status in the military administration hierarchy but were
detached for special duty — principally included the Chekiang Regional
Commander (Tsung-ping kuan), who was the ranking field commander
in the province; a Regional Vice Commander^(Fu tsung-ping kuan);
an Assistant Regional Commander (TsTan-chiang) for Hangchow, Chia-
hsing, and Hu-chou prefectures, stationed at Hai-yen; and the Chekiang
Mobile Corps Commander (Yu-chi chiang-chttn), stationed at Hangchow
city. The contingents of tactical troops that were commanded by these
officers were no doubt drawn in some part from the Guard garrisons
and militia units in the sector; but, probably more importantly, they
included specially-recruited local mercenaries (mu-tsu jL-ffi ) and
military units assigned to Chekiang duty from outside the province. In
the Ming tradition, aboriginal tribes from central and southwestern
China were highly favored for such special deployment, although in
action against Wako marauders in the 1550f s they had not proved wholly
reliable.
One contemporary source tells us that when Hu Tsung-hsien assum-
ed his post as Supreme Commander in early 1556 he found that extra-
provincial forces borrowed from Szechwan, Hukuang (i.e. modern Hupei
and Hunan), Shantung, and Honan provinces at the request of his pre-
decessors had been disbanded and sent home on the strength of Chao
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Wen-huaTs assurances to the court that coastal marauders were now
under control; that his main force was three thousand mercenary
recruits who were in such poor condition they were unfit for action;
and that his only special reserves were one thousand aboriginal tribes-
men borrowed from the Jung-mei area of modern Hupei province and
eight hundred troops recruited in North China by the Mobile Corps
Commander Tsung Li 3f.i>& (1510-1566). 2 9 This reckoning probably
does not include tactical forces who were nearby under the control of
Regional Commander Ytt Ta-yu and Regional Vice Commander Lu
TTang, both veterans of many coastal campaigns; nor does it take
account of regular and irregular forces available in other sectors of
HuTs jurisdiction, to the north in modern Kiangsu province and south
of Hangchow Bay in Chekiang. For immediate marshalling against
Hstt Hai within the Che-hsi sector itself, the tactical forces may have
approached a total of ten thousand.
3. Hu Versus Hst! Hai in the Campaign of 1556
The many campaigns against marauders that were undertaken
during the 1550 Ts were abundantly recorded by participants and their
contemporaries. The Wako problem attracted great attention at court,
so that official chronicles of the era abound in relevant documents.
Moreover, residents of the highly cultured Southeast, including such
famous contemporary litterateurs as Kuei Yu-kuang|^^ ?£ (1506-1571)
and TTang Shun-chihy^/'/|j;£_ (1507-1560), churned out essays and memoirs
on the subject in even greater abundance, based on their personal
experiences and observations. Unfortunately, these source materials
are of highly variable usefulness for understanding the wide sweep of
events, and they are often frustratingly vague and contradictory about
the dates and sequences of particular events. Later generations of
Chinese and, eventually, Japanese historians have labored to produce
reliable chronicles and analyses of the Wako crises, but without by
any means solving all the problems even of simple chronology. 31
The campaign against Hsll Hai in 1556 has not previously been
studied in any detail, to the best of my knowledge, perhaps because
the sources are peculiarly contradictory and confusing. In trying to
pin down essential particulars of the campaign in the summary that
follows, I rely primarily on two contemporary documents. One is
specifically a narrative account of the campaign against Hstt Hai in
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particular, by Mao Kfun ^i^ (1512-1601), a member of Supreme
Commander Huf s secretarial staff,32 The other is a broader but
often more detailed chronicle of anti-Wako activities in the Che-hsi
sector from 1553 through 1556, by Ts?ai Chiu-te jJLtLjjfe > a resident
of Hai-yen, whose preface is dated 1558.33 Combining data from these
documents in ways that seem to make sense and supplementing them
from the court's Veritable Records (Shih-lu) and similar sources^
gives us what I believe is a generally reliable understanding of Hstt
HaiTs activities in 1556 and of Hu Tsung-hsienTs campaign against him.
Since Hu Tsung-hsienTs general strategy and capabilities required that
he leave the initiative to the invaders, the following phases are defined
by Hsu* HaiTs activities.
Phase I: Hstt Hai!s Initial Assault
SUMMARY: Apparently under the strategic direction of Wang
Chih in Goto, separate fleets of Wako raiders began landing in different
parts of the Southeast in the second lunar month of 1556. One group
reportedly "several thousand" strong landed on the north bank of the
Yangtze River and began plundering Yang-chou and Chen-chiang
prefectures, threatening the heart of the Yangtze-Grand Canal water-
ways complex. A second group of similar size landed on the south bank
of the Yangtze in the vicinity of Shanghai and began plundering inland
along the Wu-sung River. A third group of similar size struck to the
south of Hangchow Bay, in the Ningpo region. These three relatively
small-scale invasions were soon reported to be diversionary efforts,
intended to draw attention and troops away from Che-hsi. There Hstt
Hai himself, with a force of "more than ten thousand," hoped to subdue
the Hangchow area and then turn north to Hu-chou and the great city of
Soochow, and eventually to intimidate the dynasty's auxiliary capital,
Nanking. Hstt HaiTs force appeared in Cha-pfu harbor, easily destroyed
local naval forces that opposed them, smashed their own seagoing ships
as a symbol of their determination not to withdraw, and then moved
northward (presumably in small boats) around Chin-shan Guard to a
familiar raiders' haunt at Che-lin. Hstt Hai was soon joined there by
other Satsuma-based raiders under the leadership of Ch'en Tung Pijijt
and Yeh Ma-$r jfo, (also referred to as Yeh Ming4^ and Ma Yeh^-ijjr ),
who had been plundering separately in the Shanghai region to the west.
In the third or fourth month these groups combined and moved south-
ward to besiege the walled garrison at Cha-pTu but broke off the siege
after a week or so. Meantime, supporting columns of raiders from
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Che-lin and from the Shanghai area pressed inland to the vicinity of
Chia-shan.
When raiders first landed at Cha-pfu and to the north, Hu Tsung-
hsien had just assumed responsibility as Supreme Commander and was
apparently at his normal headquarters in Hangchow city. He alerted
all his subordinates to the danger and dispatched some of his forces
northeastward along the coast to Kan-pTu and Hai-yen. The defense
intendant of the Chia-hsing and Hu-chou circuit, Liu TTaoj|*j^ (chin-
shih 1538), apparently moved up the coast from his normal base at
Hai-yen to strengthen the walled garrison at Cha-p!u, and Grand
Coordinator Yttan O rushed toward Cha-pTu with what forces he could
rally in the ChTung-te area, Hu Tsung-hsien himself accompanied a
detachment northward from Hangchow into the Chia-hsing region,
whence he could move either northward to meet raiders of the Wu-sung
River area or eastward to close in on Cha-pTu.35
The first and most direct challenge came from the north, as raid-
ers passed through the Chia-shan region toward the Chia-hsing
prefectural city. Hu, considering guile better than force in the circum-
stances, baited the raiders with a skiff loaded with more than a hundred
jugs of poisoned wine and manned by two reliable soldiers disguised as
troop-victuallers, who fled at first sight of the enemy vanguard.
Seizing the poisoned wine, the raiders halted and made merry. Some
died. By this time a detachment of "several thousand" newly-arrived
aboriginal tribesmen from Pao-ching in modern Hunan province had
joined Hu. They were anxious for a fight, and their chieftain, dis-
regarding Hufs cautions about the raiders1 wiliness, led his men
straight into an enemy ambush. Hu rallied the survivors and set up
an ambush of his own, which mauled the advancing enemy sufficiently
to send him scurrying away northward toward Soochow. ^6
Already, in the third or fourth month, Liu TTao was under siege
in Cha-pfu. Liu seems to have led his troops and the townspeople in
a gallant defense of the walls. Soon Hstt Hai, learning that both Hu
Tsung-hsien and Yttan O were converging on him, broke off the siege.
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Phase II: The Thrust Inland
SUMMARY: On withdrawing from Cha-pfu early in the fourth
month, Hsli Hai moved his force inland. They overcame resistance
offered by government troops from Hai-yen and Hai-ning, and for a
time they plundered undisturbed in the Hsia-shih and YUan-hua areas.
In mid-month, now resigned to by-passing Hangchow, Hsti Hai moved
on further inland to the northwest, reappearing to plunder the market
towns of Tsao-lin and Wu-chen on the 18th and 19th days of the fourth
month. Wu-chen is strategically located at the juncture of Hu-chou
and Chia-hsing prefectures of Chekiang and Soochow prefecture of
Nan Chihli to the north; in 1555 Hsti Hai had used Wu-chen as a base
for harassing both the Hu-chou and the Soochow regions. Plundering
through this sector again, his raiders on the 20th now encountered
government forces near Tsao-lin. Three hard-fought battles followed
in the region between Tsao-lin and ChTung-te, in which HstHs forces
were mauled and Hsli himself was wounded. But on the 23rd, when
Hsti seemed on the verge of disengaging and fleeing in disarray, his
scouts observed that the government forces were exhausted and without
supplies and that no reinforcements were anywhere near; and in one
more sharp encounter the raiders prevailed, slaughtering the govern-
ment forces.
As soon as Hu Tsung-hsienfs scouts reported that Hsti Haifs raiders
were moving toward Wu-chen, Hu maneuvered to hem them in there.
He ordered (a) troops from Soochow prefecture to move down to the
north of Wu-chen, (b) waterborne troops of Hu-chou to move across to
the west of Wu-chen, and (c) North China troops then at Chia-hsing to
take up a defensive position near Wu-chen. With his own reserves of
mercenary recruits and Jung-mei aborigines, he also moved cautiously
toward Wu-chen. Grand Coordinator Ytian O simultaneously moved
northward out of Chfung-te, en route picking up the North China troops
that were moving westward from Chia-hsing under the control of Mobile
Corps Commander Tsung Li.
It was Tsung Li and some nine hundred of his North China troops
who came upon the much more numerous raiders near Tsao-lin and
fought with them for successive days, eventually being almost totally
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massacred. Contemporary chroniclers called Tsung Lifs struggle with
Hstt Hai the most glorious example of a few standing heroically against
a multitude in the whole history of warfare. According to Mao KTun,
Yttan O fled from the field after an initial skirmish. According to Tsfai
Chiu-te, Yttan O arrived in the vicinity only when Tsung Li's forces were
already routed. Hu Tsung-hsien had at that lime got no farther than
ChTung-te in his progress toward Wu-chen.
During the fourth month, between Hstt HaiTs departure from Cha-pTu
and his victory at Tsao-lin, other Wako raiders were busy in other
areas. North of Che-hsi, marauders plundered along the north bank of
the Yangtze, ravaging Wu-wei county deep inland and the important
grain depot at Kua-chou, where the Grand Canal "crosses" the Yangtze;
and raiders kept active in the Shanghai area, finally being routed by
the Chekiang Regional Commander Ytt Ta-yu acting jointly with the
defense intendant of the Soochow and Sung-chiang circuit, Tung Pang-
cheng-fefap^. South of Che-hsi, raiders freely plundered the region
between Hangchow and Ningpo, twice within one week sacking the
Tzru-chTi county seat; and another group ravaged Wen-chou prefecture
in southernmost Chekiang.
Phase III; The Siege of TTung-hsiang
SUMMARY: Victorious over Tsung Li but wounded and with
a battered force, Hstt Hai pursued Yttan O to the walled city Tfung-hsiang
where he understood there were tempting stocks of supplies. He laid
siege to the city for approximately a month, using a variety of siege
weapons including assault towers mounted on boats, a giant battering
ram suspended in a wheeled scaffold, and a cannon of the type called
"the general" (chiang-chttn). But the city wall had been newly built in
1553 and was defended with imagination and verve by the county
magistrate, Chin Yen£\$i (chin-shih 1553). The marauders soon lost
interest in costly assaults and settled down to starve out the city,
meanwhile plundering freely in its environs. They became so inattentive
that Grand Coordinator Yttan O was eventually able to slip out of the city
by night and get away. The Wako leaders also became suspicious of one
another. Hstt Hai and his powerful ally Ch?en Tung became so
antagonistic that they finally broke off the siege and withdrew in
separate directions, apparently between the 19th and 23rd days of the
fifth month.
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When Hu Tsung-hsien, in ChTung-te, learned that Tsung LiTs
force had been massacred and that Ytian O was besieged in TTung-
hsiang, he was confronted with a difficult decision. Mao K'un tells
us Hu considered the situation in the following terms;
The North China troops have been beaten, and my own
troops are so disheartened that they dare not fight.
The Southeast is no longer manageable! Now the
bandits have got TTung-hsiang in trouble; but if I
further divide up the forces they will ravage ChTung-te
and ruin me as well (as Yttan O). It would be as
if the two of us were to drown ourselves in each
otherTs arms. What would become of the country
then!38
/ • •
Deciding that caution was in order, Hu withdrew to his headquarters
in Hangchow. But he made a show of organizing a relief expedition by
ordering troops to converge around TTung-hsiang: from Chia-hsing
southward, from Hu-ehou to Wu-chen, from Hai-yen to Wang-tien, and
from ChTung-te to Shih-men. ̂ 9 He also ordered what remained of
Tsung Lifs North China troops to gather together at ChTung-te. Realiz-
ing that all these troops were badly demoralized by news of the Tsao-
lin massacre, he also submitted to the court an urgent request for new
contingents of aboriginal tribesmen from Pao-ching and Yung-shun in
Hunan. Ignoring strongly worded, denunciatory appeals for help that
were smuggled out of TTung-hsiang by his besieged colleague Ytian 0,40
Hu decided that, while awaiting reinforcements, he would try the same
pacification techniques on Hsti Hai that seemed to be working success-
fully on Wang Chih in Goto. Mao KTun cites HuTs arguments as follows:
Even though (Wang) Chih and (Hsti) Hai are not of one
mind about whether to submit or to resist, they are
certainly as intimate as are lips with teeth. Once
Chih has repented, can Hai alone not be persuaded with
talk about his patriotic duty? If not, since he is an
avaricious fellow, we can try luring him with baits and
perhaps delude him. It seems to me that the T!ung-hsiang
city wall, though small, is strong. If we delay for a
few weeks, then the frontier forces of Yung (-shun) and
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Pao (-ching) will arrive, and we can surely smash him. 41
So Supreme Commander Hu began negotiating with Hstt Hai through
intermediaries.
Hsli Hai, wounded and bogged down in an extended siege, was shaken
by the news brought by HuTs agents that Wang Chihrs godson Wang Ao
had long since surrendered himself at Ningpo, bringing assurances that
Wang Chih himself was preparing to accept pacification. (Before the
T'ung-hsiang siege was ended, Wang Ao had even aided government
troops to defeat Wako marauders who were withdrawing from the
TzTu-chTi region south of Hangchow Bay.) Hu?s agents persuaded Hstt
Hai that his only hope of evading ultimate ruin was to cooperate similarly
with the Supreme Commander. Hstt Hai argued that he was not alone
and could not speak for his ally Ch'en Tung; but HuTs agents intimated
that a separate agreement had been reached with ChTen Tung, thus
making Hstt Hai furiously suspicious of Ch'en. At the same time ChTen
was becoming equally suspicious of Hstt Hai as he learned that a series
of government agents were visiting Hstt!s camp. Hstt Hai eventually
gave his word that he would surrender himself and accept pacification,
on the condition that Supreme Commander Hu would provide substantive
gifts with which Hstt might mollify his Japanese followers and would
memorialize requesting that HsiTs offenses be pardoned. Hu Tsung-
hsien was happy to comply with these terms. Negotiating agents
carried great gifts of money and silks to Hstt Hai!s camp outside TTung-
hsiang. Hstt Hai!s messengers repeatedly expressed his gratitude, and
as evidence of his good faith Hstt Hai handed over to the government
some two hundred Chinese held captive by his men.42 When he ultimate-
ly withdrew from T!ung-hsiang, he maliciously warned the defenders
to beware of ChTen Tung. Enraged upon finding himself thus abandoned
by his ally, ChTen Tung assaulted the city with new energy for one more
day and then himself withdrew.
Meanwhile, when the court learned of the disaster at Tsao-lin and
the siege of Tfung-hsiang, it ordered the calling up of troops from wide-
spread areas of the country into a great expeditionary force for the
Southeast, and on the eighth day of the fifth month Chao Wen-hua was
once again dispatched to supervise activities there. On the 17th day,
in response to Hu Tsung-hsienTs request, six thousand tribesmen of
Pao-ching and Yung-shun were ordered to hasten to join HuTs command. 43
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Phase IV: Withdrawal to the Coast
SUMMARY: When the marauders abandoned their siege of
TTung-hsiang late in the fifth month, they were heavily laden with
plunder and seemed to have little heart for further hard campaigning.
TsTai Chiu-te reports that their booty filled more than one thousand
boats and that as they wound through the environs of Chia-hsing pre-
fectural city their boats stretched out more than twenty Chinese miles
A A
(li). This must have been one group alone, since it appears that
Chfen Tung and Yeh Ma made their way to a coastal camp at Hsin-
ch'ang north of Che-lin in Nan Chihli, whereas Hsti Hai wound his way
back through the Hsia-shih area.4 5 His men set up separate temporary
camps near Wang-tien, Yttan-hua, and Hai-yen, and he then gathered
his forces together again near Cha-p!u, where Chren Tung and Yeh Ma
soon rejoined him. There was some skirmishing while the raiders
were returning to the coast. What was presumably the Chren Tung-Yeh
Ma group, while passing through the Chia-hsing area, had an indecisive
skirmish with a government force and lost twenty or thirty boats; and
the Hsti Hai group fought off a Hai-ning Guard unit in the Hai-yen area.46
When all of the marauders reassembled at Cha-pTu, early in the sixth
month, antagonisms among the leaders became steadily worse, and they
schemed against one another so viciously that only HsU Hai remained at
large by the end of the seventh month.
During the marauders1 winding withdrawals from Tfung-hsiang to
the coast, some of Supreme Commander Hufs subordinates clamored
to attack them in force. But Hu argued that available government troops
were still so outnumbered that even a local victory might be disastrous
to his over-all position. He insisted on pursuing his pacification tactics,
taking advantage of rivalries among the marauder chiefs so as to bring
about their submission peaceably. Hsti Hai had already accepted
pacification in word though not yet in deed. Through intermediaries
who made a succession of courtesy calls on the raiders1 camps, Hu
kept enticing Hsti with promises and urging him to give further evidence
of good faith in the fashion of Wang Ao.
Wang Ao, after his previous foray in the TzTu-chfi area, continued
to assist government forces to the south in the sixth month, subduing
raiders on Chou-shan island and at Li-piao Bay, both in the Ningpo
sector. Requested to assist in suppressing Hsti Hai, Wang Ao demurred,
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saying that only his godfather, Wang Chih, had sufficient authority for
that. Hu Tsung-hsien memorialized about Wang Aofs cooperation
and requested that he be rewarded. The Ministry of War counseled
the court that Hu should be allowed to use his own discretion in handling
Wang Ao, adding, Tfln the practice of war one utilizes both spies and
bait, sometimes summons(chaoj| ; peremptorily?) and sometimes
mollifies (fui^r). The important thing is to accommodate to changing
situations and not be rigidly bound.tf48 This advice was approved. Hu
consequently issued gifts to Wang Ao on his own authority and sent him
back to Japan to persuade his godfather to surrender himself.
The bait offered Hstt Hai and his allies was transportation. Hsfi
had burned his ships on arriving at Gha-pTu early in the year, and Chfen
Tung and Yeh Ma had been ashore even longer without access to sea-
worthy vessels. All the marauders, with great accumulations of
plunder, were now anxious about being marooned on the China coast
with no hope of getting away with their booty. Hu Tsung-hsien realized
this and made them a tempting offer. All who wished to surrender, he
promised, would be welcomed and given status in the military establish-
ment, whereas all who wished to return to Japan would be provided with
seagoing vessels for the voyage. Although the marauders were by no
means obtuse, as Tsfai Chiu-te notes, they had virtually no choice but
to make at least a show of cooperation. So on the 2nd day of the sixth
month they sent word to Hu that his offer was accepted. 49
Hu Tsung-hsien, apparently confident that Hsli Hai's will was broken,
now began pressing him aggressively. He sent agents to point out that
HsU's fellow marauders in the Sung-chiang area to the north were bloat-
ed with spoils and were again heading inland. It was suggested that if
HsU Hai were to prove his sincerity by attacking the Sung-chiang raiders,
he could have their spoils for himself and might even find some use for
their boats. HsU Hai, no doubt thinking he might in this way quickly
get his hands on some seaworthy craft as well as some additional booty,
complied. As he moved his forces westward to intercept the Sung-chiang
group, Hu Tsung-hsien could not but realize that if HsU Hai should
renege on his promised cooperation and join forces with the Sung-chiang
raiders for a drive southward into Che-hsi, the consequences would be
disastrous. Hu had some misgivings, and no doubt several days of
anxiety. But HsU Hai kept his part of the bargain. He set upon the
Sung-chiang raiders at Chu-ching north of the Chekiang border and
routed them. To his dismay, however, most of his intended victims
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got away in the night with their boats and booty intact. Moreover, Hu
Tsung-hsien had alerted Regional Commander Yti Ta-yu, who was
lurking in the rear of the Sung-chiang group, to what was going on.
While the marauder groups were fighting each other, Ytt burned Hstt
HaiTs own river boats; and then, when the Sung-chiang survivors
appeared on the coast fleeing seaward, Yttfs fleet pounced on them and
wiped them out. 50 jjsll Hai slunk back to his Cha-pTu harbor lair with
an exaggerated conception of HuTs powers and thinking himself at Hu!s
mercy. He sent Hu elaborate gifts and reassurances of his obedience;
he even turned over a younger brother named Hsti Hung as a hostage. 51
At about this time Assistant Regional Commander I# TTang won a
decisive victory over Wako raiders in TTai-chou prefecture south of
Ningpo after they had subdued the Hsien-chtt county seat. 5 2 Thus®
with Chao Wen-hua approaching the Yangtze with an army ordered up
by Peking and with marauders both north and south of Che-hsi having
been dealt heavy blows, Hu Tsung-hsien was increasingly free to
concentrate on Hstt Hai. He now plotted to persuade Hstt to betray and
surrender his chief allies, Yeh Ma and Chfen Tung.
It happened that Hstt Hai and Yeh Ma had already developed a
sullen rivalry over a certain Mistress Chu (Chu faifjt$), a beauty
whom Yeh Ma had taken captive at Yttan-hua and made nis concubine.
Hstt was also angry that Yeh Ma, who had accumulated the greatest
quantity of booty among the chiefs, refused to agree to an equal division
of spoils as the gang prepared to break up, some expecting to stay in
China and some expecting to return to Japan when ships were provided.
So Hstt Hai, at HuTs urging, arranged parleys with the prefectural
authorities at Chia-hsing on the 26th day of the sixth month and again
on the 3rd day of the seventh month to discuss the governments
progress in gathering together the promised ships. Hstt got Yeh Ma
to accompany him to these parleys, at which they were courteously
entertained and given apologetic excuses for delays. Yeh Ma was so
anxious to get out of China by this time, TsTai Chiu-te reports, that he
was easily duped. On the second visit to Chia-hsing he got drunk and
was taken into custody with no trouble. 53 A hundred or so of his
followers, outraged at his capture but having no proof that Hstt Hai had
betrayed him, soon gave Hstt by their conduct an excuse for taking them
also into custody and turning them over to the government.
Supreme Commander Hu now pressed Hstt Hai to betray his more
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powerful ally, Ch'en Tung, The fate of Yeh Ma naturally had deepened
the distrust of Hsti that ChTen had nursed since the siege of TTung-hsiang,
so that Chfen was not to be so easily duped. Moreover, Chren had long
been secretary or tutor of the younger brother of the Lord of Satsuma,
Hstt's own patron; and the younger brother was apparently present as a
member of the raiding party. Hsti Hai, while trying to keep Hu Tsung-
hsien at bay with a show of cooperation, was by no means happy at the
prospect of spoiling his relations with the Japanese. So he was most
hesitant to make an overt move against Ch'en Tung, The Supreme
Commander, understanding his difficulty, began sending agents with
beautiful trinkets for two of HstTs favorite mistresses, enlisting their
aid in his campaign to urge Hstt to action. Hu also made use of the
captured Yeh Ma, who no doubt happily wrote a letter to ChTen Tung,
at HuTs suggestion, explaining HsttTs treachery and urging Chfen to
destroy him. Hu saw to it that the letter was put in HsttTs hands
rather than ChfenTs. This served two purposes. Not only did it in-
furiate Hstt Hai to the point of determining that he must get rid of ChTen;
it also led him to believe that Hu was genuinely befriending and protect-
ing him, and that he consequently owed Hu a great debt of gratitude.
At this juncture, on the 6th day of the seventh month, Chao Wen-hua
arrived in Chia-hsing, and units of his expeditionary force soon began
taking up positions in the sector between Chia-hsing and the coast.
Grand Coordinator Yttan O, who since escaping from the siege of T'ung-
hsiang had been conducting defensive operations south of Hangchow
Bay, now also brought his forces into Chia-hsing. Hstt Hai was
increasingly overawed by the dignitaries arrayed against him even
though Hu and Chao, for their part, were not yet sure they had enough
strength for an attempt at straightforward extermination. Hu could
not expect to protract his pacification tactics much longer without
exposing himself to severe criticism. So one of Hurs negotiating agents
was sent to Hstt Hai with a message from Chao:
If you bring in your forces for submission you may
escape the death penalty. But if you do not present
Chf en Tung in custody together with a thousand or
so severed heads (of his supporters) I fear I shall
not be able to appease the court. If you are able to
do this, then I will join the Supreme Commander in
memorializing for your pardon. Otherwise, you
will be pounded into powder. 54
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In desperation, Hstt Hai now gathered up booty worth "more than a
thousand gold" taels and sent it to Chfen TungTs patron, the younger
brother of the Lord of Satsuma, asking permission to borrow ChTenTs
services. When Chfen appeared, Hstt managed to get him delivered
into government hands, no doubt by deception. Hstt now realized he
could never safely return to Japan, and he knew that ChTen TungTs
supporters would murder him at any opportunity.
Hu Tsung-hsien pressed his psychological advantage ever more
strongly. He now sent a personal message to Hstt Hai:
I want to be lenient with you, but Minister Chao considers
your crimes to be truly heinous. Why not heed me ?
Several tens of ships are moored on the coast. If you
rally (ChTen Tung's followers) to make a rush for
these ships on the coast (with the consequence that)
a thousand or so can be captured for presentation to
Chao, you might thereby save yourself. 55
As Mao KTun observes, Hstt Hai might have been reluctant, but he had
no alternative. 56 So he came to an agreement with circuit intendant
Liu Tfao, stationed at Hai-yen. Government ships were indeed moored
in Cha-pTu harbor, while Liu Trao concealed a large force of govern-
ment troops inside the Cha-pTu walls. Announcing that the long-
promised government ships were at last available, Hstt Hai shepherded
the whole marauder host onto the Cha-pfu beach, carefully restraining
his own followers. When the others were scrambling gleefully for the
ships, at a signal from Hstt Hai, Liu TTao led his forces out of the
walled garrison and slaughtered the disorganized mob. Those who
managed to get aboard the ships were quickly rounded up by a naval
squadron waiting for them. The marauder lair at Cha-pTu harbor was
totally laid waste, and Hstt Hai crept away to a new camp at nearby
Liang-chuang to work out the best fate he could. ̂ ' It was now the end
of the seventh month.
Phase V: Surrender and Extermination
SUMMARY: Having fulfilled all the tests of sincerity that had
been imposed on him, Hstt Hai demanded that his surrender be accepted,
and on the first day of the eighth month he and a hundred or so of his
followers appeared for audience with the provincial authorities in PTing-
hu county seat. He was politely received and was temporarily allowed
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to take up residence in an estate near the city. There Hsti eventually
realized that he had been totally deceived, and he tried to rally new
support among his Chinese neighbors. But he was now surrounded by
overwhelming government forces, which on the 25th and 26th days of
the month assaulted and destroyed both his temporary camp and the
lair at Liang-chuang near Cha-pTu. Hstt Hai drowned himself in a
stream.
When the Wako raiders had been decimated in Cha-pTu harbor and
Hstt Hai had settled at Liang-chuang, Hstt asked permission to present
himself in formal surrender at PTing-hu, and it was agreed that he
should do so on the second day of the eighth month. Inspector of the
Armies Chao Wen-hua, Supreme Commander Hu Tsung-hsien, Grand
Coordinator Yttan O, and Regional Inspector Chao KTung-chao $j $L$&
(chin-shih 1544) all gathered at PTing-hu to receive him. To the
annoyance of these dignitaries, Hstt appeared one day early, deployed
his whole force outside the city, and demanded that he be admitted with
a hundred or so of his men in full armor. Marshaling a strong show
of military force along the streets of the city, but with misgivings
nevertheless, the dignitaries consented. Assembling on a dais in the
county yamen, they gave him audience in a remarkable scene vividly
described by Mao KTun as follows:
(Hstt) Hai and his warriors faced north toward the four
dignitaries and in succession kowtowed and cried, "O
star in the firmament, we deserve death; we deserve
death! " (Hstt) Hai wanted to pay special respects to
Hu (Tsung-hsien) but did not know him by sight. So he
glanced for guidance to the intermediary agents, who
signaled him with their eyes. (Hstt) Hai then faced
Hu once more, kowtowed, and cried, "O star in the
firmament, I deserve death; I deserve death!" Hu
thereupon descended from the dais, patted (Hstt) Hai
on the head with his hand, and said to him, "You have
distressed the Southeast for a long time! Now that
you have at last submitted, the court will pardon you.
But be sure not to make any further trouble!fT (Hstt)
Hai again kowtowed and cried, "O star in the firmament,
I deserve death, I deserve death!" Then the four
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dignitaries handed out generous gifts, and (the
visitors) departed.58
TsTai Chiu-te describes the scene in almost identical terms but adds
that Regional Inspector Chao KTung-chao could not control his indignation
and shouted at Hstt, "You have slaughtered our people beyond counting.
What punishment you deserve! "59
By this time the whole expeditionary force brought from the north
by Chao Wen-hua and local forces under the control of Regional Com-
mander Ytl Ta-yu and Regional Vice Commander Lu T'ang were all in
position in Che-hsi. But the authorities in PTing-hu were still wary of
Hstt Hai. "They calculated that he still had more than a thousand men
under his command,fT Mao KTun relates, "and they were so fierce and
violent that it would be difficult to crush them. "60 Moreover, it
would still be a while before the six thousand tribesmen coming from
Pao-ching and Yung-shun could be expected to arrive. So they invited
Hstt Hai to choose a campsite where he could wait comfortably while,
presumably, they pleaded his case at court. He remembered having
been impressed, during previous raiding visits, by a so-called "Shen-
family estate" (Shen-chia-chuang ;^, jjjj2& ) outside the city, 61 and they
rented it for him. Hstt Hai settled there on the 8th day of the month.
He even suggested that once his pacification was regularized, he would
like to buy the estate and three thousand nearby acres (mou) of
agricultural land. 62 Hu Tsung-hsien persuaded him to encamp remnants
of Chfen TungTs raider group alongside his own, assuring him that
"government troops will protect you against the (Ch!en) Tung gang;
don't be afraid. " 6 3
Tsrai Chiu-te reports that Hstt Hai was not yet resigned to a
disastrous fate. On the 11th and 12 th days of the month he invited
Chinese residents of his neighborhood to wine-drinking parties, and he
thus enticed two or three hundred young men to join him afresh. Some-
what emboldened, he rebuffed an invitation from the authorities in
PTing-hu to attend a moon-watching party on the 15th, and on the 17th
he went so far as to detain and decapitate an envoy from Hu Tsung-
hsien. 64 Hu, for his part, was daily sending agents to urge on the
approaching troops from Pao-ching and Yung-shun; and when Hstt Hai
sent him two hundred gold taels for the purchase of wine Hu arranged
for the wine to be delivered contaminated with poisonous drugs."
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The Pao-ching and Yung-shun tribesmen apparently reached PTing-
hu on the 20th, and peripheral skirmishing began in the area of Hstl
Haifs encampment. The government forces seem to have been none
too eager for the culminating assault. So Hu persuaded his captive
Ch'en Tung to write a letter to his former followers warning them that
Hstl Hai was collaborating with the government forces in a plan to crush
them in a pincers operation. This provoked a clash between Hsti Hairs
group and the Chfen Tung group during the early morning of the 25th, in
which Hsti Hai was wounded; and on the 25th and 26th government forces
moved in decisively on all sides. All marauders in the Shen estate
were wiped out, and Regional Commander Ytl Ta-yu also destroyed
remnants in the camp at Liang-chuang. Hstl Hai fs drowned body was
found in a stream, and it was decapitated. It is reported that from
1, 200 to 1,600 raiders were decapitated in all .6 6
In subsequent mopping-up operations, Regional Vice Commander
Lu TTang pursued and captured a Japanese named Shingoro, whom Hsti
Hai had dispatched from the Shen estate to find his way to Japan; and
during the following winter Regional Commander Yii Ta-yu cleared
Chou-shan island to the south of the Wako remnants in refuge there.
Reports of the victories in the PTing-hu region from Chao Wen-hua
and Hu Tsung-hsien reached the court at Peking on the 19th day of the
ninth month. Congratulations and promotions were ordered; and on the
27th day sacrificial reports of the extermination of Wako marauders in
the Southeast were made in ceremonies at the imperial altars and
temples in Peking. ' The prisoners Yeh Ma, ChTen Tung, Hstl Hung,
and Shingoro, and the severed head of Hsti Hai were all subsequently
displayed in imperial audience,68 and in the twelfth month of the year
the prisoners were executed.
Epilogue. The campaign against Hstl Hai in 1556 was by no means
the end of ChinaTs troubles with Wako marauders, but it did terminate
the worst of the plundering in the Southeast. In 1557, by means of
equally complicated and intriguing negotiations, Hu Tsung-hsien
disposed of Wang Chih. Thereafter the Wako raiders were less well
organized, and they usually by-passed Nan Chihli and Chekiang to raid
southward in Fukien and Kwangtung provinces.
Hu Tsung-hsien remained in power in the Southeast and in imperial
favor despite the successive ruin of his patrons Chao Wen-hua in 1557
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and Yen Sung in 1562; but he was repeatedly denounced for corruption
and abuse of authority. At the end of 1562 he was relieved of duty
and taken to Peking to answer such charges. The emperor defended
him as a loyal and effective official, and he was allowed to retire more
or less honorably. Denunciations continued, and in 1565, despite the
emperor's continuing sympathy for him, he was sent to prison, where
he died of ill treatment. ̂  9
The official history of the dynasty, the Ming-shih, says of Hu:
nTsung-hsien suffered disgrace because of his extravagance and
defilement. But if he had permitted the scoundrels Hsli Hai and Wang
Chih to evade death, how much more trouble would have occurred can
only be guessed. "7 0 Other historians have similarly found it necessary
to overlook his shortcomings. The editors of the great eighteenth-
century imperial catalogue Ssu-kTu chTuan-shu tsung-mu insisted that
he should not be belittled. "Although he was not an ideal man, M they
judged, nhis abilities certainly made him one of the heroes of the
age."71 '
4. Conclusion
The history of Hu Tsung-hsienTs campaign against Hstt Hai in 1556
has relevance to an almost unlimited range of important scholarly
problems. Among these are problems concerning the socioeconomic
development of China1 s Southeast, Sino-foreign and especially Sino-
Japanese relations, JapanTs relations with the outside world in general
and JapanTs own economic and cultural development in the sixteenth
century, conditions of service generally in China1 s traditional govern-
ment, and the political climate and history of Emperor Shih-tsungTs
reign, in addition to multi-faceted problems concerning traditional
China1 s military history and institutions in particular.
This paper is hardly the place to pursue all these varied ramifi-
cations, but it might not be amiss to close here with some brief
comments on the nature and exercise of HuTs authority as a commander.
In his valuable recent article, "Policy Formulation and Decision-Making
on Issues Respecting Peace and War,Tf Professor Jung-pang Lo has
demonstrated conclusively that important decisions arrived at by the
Ming court were not dictated according to nthe whim and caprice of
any single individual. "72 His study can be usefully supplemented by
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evidence from the 1556 campaign about military decision-making on
lower levels, regionally and locally.
One thing immediately apparent is that Supreme Commander Hu
was in no sense a regional warlord of the modern type. He was subject
to the court directly and through such intermediary agents as Chao
Wen-hua. Moreover, although this aspect of the situation is not
explicitly shown in the foregoing narrative, his relationship with the
court was vulnerable to harassment through means that by-passed the
normal chain of command — for example, through personal contacts
at court that could be exploited by his subordinates and by influential
personages of Chekiang, He was also plied with advice by friends and
acquaintances, which at any time could have been transformed into sharp
criticism poured into receptive ears at court.
But it is equally apparent that Shih-tsung and his court made few
specific demands on Supreme Commander Hu as regards the Wako
troubles. They wanted the troubles terminated, and they ruled full
pacification out of consideration as an acceptable means. But Hu was
authorized, implicitly and explicitly, to achieve his goal by tactical
decisions made at his own discretion (pien-i <j§> j[ )•
The pattern of events in 1556 suggests that it was tactically
important to Hu Tsung-hsien that Hstt Hai should at all times believe
Hu to have great military force at his disposition, and that Hstt at
certain times should believe Hu to be his friend. When Hu in fact
lacked the resources to be militarily aggressive he unhesitatingly
resorted to bribery, courteous exchanges of messages, promises of
official status and even of ships, friendly albeit false warnings of
plots on the part of HstlTs colleagues, and even cordial personal
receptions; and he consistently avoided decisive military confront-
ations. On the other hand, when circumstances warranted, Hu attempt-
ed to poison the enemy, connived with Hstt's colleagues and mistresses
against him, coercively tricked Hstt into unpalatable and disadvantageous
undertakings, and made threatening shows of force. Moreover, as the
military situation altered in his favor Hu became increasingly belligerent,
and in the end he organized and led a military extermination of Hstt.
Except for the final extermination of Hstt Hai, none of Hu Tsung-
hsien^ tactical maneuvers was specifically sanctioned by the court or
its agents. Moreover, for the most part, they seem not to have been
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supported eagerly by his subordinates. Decisions were made by Hu in
response to the changing situations that confronted him. He made them
in consultation with his subordinates, but he made them on his own
authority and with full and heavy responsibility for them. It was no
doubt gratifying to him that military extermination ultimately proved
to be possible. But the evidence makes it reasonably clear that if
non-military pacification had proved to be politically acceptable, as
well as possible, Hu in his pragmatic way would just as gladly have
pursued his pacification (i.e., appeasement) tactics.
A similar sense of being free to act at onefs own discretion seems
to have characterized Supreme Commander HuTs subordinates. It is
perhaps not surprising that the local authorities at Cha-pTu and at TTung-
hsiang apparently acted on their own initiative and with self-reliance
when they were besieged and isolated. It is worthy of note, however,
that Grand Coordinator Ytlan O reportedly departed from Ch'ung-te
to go to the aid of beleaguered Cha-pru without waiting for Hurs orders;73
that Mobile Corps Commander Tsung Li apparently took the initiative
in engaging Hsti Hai near Tsao-lin without having orders from Hu to
engage him; and that even in the coordinated final assault on Hstf Hai,
Regional Commander Yti Ta-yu seems to have acted with a substantial
degree of independence. It is perhaps less surprising, but no less
suggestive, that the leader of the aboriginal tribesmen from Pao-ching
reportedly disregarded the Supreme Commander's cautions about
engaging the marauders in the Chia-shan area, to the tribesmen1 s
regret. 7^ In the same degree that Supreme Commander Hu took action
at his discretion when he had no contrary orders from the court or its
agents, so his subordinates, sometimes even in his presence, apparent-
ly took such action as they deemed appropriate.
It might be argued that the independence displayed by these various
field commanders suggests, not only that they were free of unreasonable
constraints imposed from above, but also that there was a real lack of
discipline among them. It must be kept in mind, however, that the
nature of the Wako threat was well understood, both locally and at
court; and coping with it successfully no doubt required a degree of
independence at all command levels that might have been wholly in-
appropriate in other circumstances. Whatever this analysis of the
1556 campaign may suggest in this regard, it would probably be pre-
mature to conclude that Ming armies in the field were characteristically
assemblages of quasi-independent command units.
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It might be noted, finally, that in achieving his goal Hu Tsung-
hsien seems to have been remarkably free of moralistic inhibitions,
whether externally imposed or self-developed. His mandate was to
get rid of Hsti Hai, and he did so with what seems like very little regard
for considerations of propriety, integrity, or either personal or national
honor. Surviving and winning was his mission as he conceived it; and
it is apparent that Shih-tsung shared HuTs conception, for the emperor
never seriously wavered in his judgment that Hu was a loyal and
effective official. Such things should not be disregarded in our con-
tinuing efforts to assess the national military style of traditional China.

NOTES
General: Names of government agencies and official titles are
rendered in accordance with the system set forth in my article
"Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty", in Harvard Journal
of Asiatic Studies, vol. 21 (December, 1958), pp. 1-66; and its index
of terms and titles, published in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,
vol. 23 (1960-1961), pp. 127-151, Both article and index are reprinted
in Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese History (John Bishop,
ed.: Cambridge, Mass., 1968).
1. It will be clear to any specialist that I have not exhausted all
sources that relate to the campaign of 1556, much less all sources that
relate to the Wako problem of Ming times more generally. An excellent
discussion of Chinese works of Ming times that bear on the Wako
problem is Wu Yli-nienTs article "Ming-tai Wo-kfou shih-chi chih-mu,fr
reprinted in 1968 in volume 6, pp. 231-252, of Mng-shih lun-tsTung,
edited by Pao Tsun-pfeng; and an up-to-date bibliography of relevant
Japanese materials is provided in Tanaka Takeo!s small volume, Wako
to kango boeki (Tokyo, 1961). A documentary chronicle of Wako
activities and defense against them throughout Chinese history is Wang
Pfo-lengfs Li-tai cheng-Wo wen-hsien k?ao (Cheng-chung shu-chti, 1940).
Li Kuang-ming!s Chia-ching yti-Wo Chiang-Che chu-kTo chfln kTao
(Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies, Monograph Series No. 4, 1933);
Ch!en Mao-heng!s Ming-tai Wo-kTou kTao-ltieh (same series No. 6,
1934); Wu Chrung-hanTs Ming-tai Wo-kTou fan-hua shih-ltieh (Ch'ang-
sha, 1939); Li Kuang-piTs Ming-tai yfi-Wo chan-cheng (Shanghai, 1956);
ChTen Wen-shihfs Ming Hung-wu Chia-ching ti hai-chin cheng-tsfe
(Taipei, 1966); and Chfenfs article "Ming Chia-ching nien-chien Che-
Fu yen-hai kTou-luan ytl ssu-fan mao-i ti kuan-hsi, " in Bulletin of the
Academia Sinica Institute of History and Philology, vol. 36, part 1
(1965), pp. 375-418, are all useful works of modern Chinese scholar-
ship on the subject. A. Tschepefs Japans Beziehungen zu China seit
den Altesten Zeiten bis zum Jahre 1600 (Jentschoufu, 1907) is a surpris-
ingly detailed chronicle of reference value, but without citations of
sources. Relevant modern works in Western languages especially
include Y. S. Kuno's Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent
(2vols.; Berkeley, 1937-1940); Wang Yi-tTungys Official Relations
Between China and Japan, 1368-1549 (Cambridge, Mass., 1953);
Bodo WiethoffTs Die chinesische Seeverbotspolitik und der private
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Uberseehandel von 1368 bis 1567 (Hamburg, 1963); Benjamin H. HazardTs
"Japanese Marauding in Medieval Korea: The Wako Impact on Late
Koryo" (Ph.D. dissertionf University of California at Berkeley, 1967);
HazardTs article "The Formative Years of the Wako, 1223-63, " in
Monumenta Nipponica, XXII (1967), 260-277; and James F. MllingerTs
"ChTi Chi-kuang, Chinese Military Official" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University, 1968).
2. Wang Yi-tTung, p. 80.
3. Standard map-studded sources on Ming coastal defenses are Cheng
Jo-tsengrs Cheng kTai-yang tsa-chii (Photolithographic reprint, 1932)
and ChTou-hai tTu-pien (1624 ed.is cited hereinafter), attributed to Hu
Tsung-hsien but undoubtedly also the work principally of Cheng Jo-
tseng. Cf. Wolfgang FrankeTs An Introduction to the Sources of Ming
History (Singapore, 1968), pp. 223-224; and Wang Yung, "Ming-tai
hai-fang tTu-chi lu, " reprinted in volume 6 of Ming-shih lun-tsTung,
pp. 205-230.
4. Wang Yi-tTung, pp. 10, 16-17, 48, 50,
5. On the deterioration of Ming naval power, see the stimulating
interpretive article by Lo Jung-pang, "The Decline of the Early Ming
Navy, " in Oriens Extremus, V (1958-59), 149-168.
6. See the biography of Altan Khan by Henry Serruys and Fang
Chao-ying in Draft Ming Biographies (published by the Association for
Asian Studies, Inc.), no. 1 (1964).
7. A general discussion of Ming coastal defense organization can
be found in Ming-shih (Po-na ed., 1940), 91.10a ff. More specific data
on defense organization in Chekiang is in ChTou-hai tTu-pien, 5. 8a-17b;
and particularly in Fan Lai et al., Liang-Che hai-fang lei-kfao hsti-pien
(8-chttan ed. dated 1602), especially chttan 2. Cf. Wolfgang Franke,
p. 227; and Wang Yung, pp. 212-213.
8. Ch'en Mao-heng, pp. 139-142.
9. Li Kuang-ming, passim; and ChTen Mao-heng, pp. 151 ff.
10. See the biography of Chao Wen-hua in Ming-shih, 308.17b-2la.
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11. See the biography of Chang Ching in Ming-shih, 205.4a-6a.
12. See the biography of Chou Yttn in Mng-shih, 205.6b-7a.
13. See the biography of Li TTien-chTung in Ming-shih, 205.6a-b.
14. See the biography of Yang I in Ming-shih, 205. 7a-b,
15. See the biography of Ytian O in Ming-shih, 205.13b-14a.
16. Chronological charts of Wako activities in 1555 are provided in
ChTou-hai tTu-pien, chtlan 8; and Chfen Mao-heng, pp. 78-81. Cf. Wu
ChTung-han, pp. 63 ff.
17. See the biographies of Yti Ta-yu and Lu TTang in Ming-shih,
212. la-9b; and the biography of Lu T'ang by Bodo Wiethoff in Draft
Ming Biographies, no. 6 (1966). For the victory at Wang-chiang-ching
see Hsia HsiehTs Ming t'ung-chien (reprinted ed,, 1959), chtlan 61
(vol. 3, pp. 2336-2337); Wang PTo-leng, p. 189; Wu ChTung-han, p. 58;
ChTou-hai tTu-pien, 9. 2a-3b.
18. On the life of Hstl Hai, see ChTen Mao-heng, pp. 103-104; and
KuYing-t!ai, Mng-shih chi-shih pen-mo (Wan-yu wen-kTu ed. )9 chtlan
55 (section 8, pp. 54-55). On Wang Chih, see Ch?en Mao-heng, pp. 102-
103; Ch?en Wen-shih, "Ming Chia-ching nien-chien Che-Fu yen-hai k?ou-
luan ytl ssu-fan mao-i ti kuan-hsi, " pp. 395-405; Tanaka Takeo, pp. 200
ff.; Bodo Wiethoff, Die chine si sche Seeverbotspolitik und der private
Uberseehandel von 1368 bis 1567, pp, 188 ff.; Fu Wei-lin, Mng-shu
(reprinted ed9, 1937) chtlan 162, pp. 3213-3217 (a biography of Wang
Chih, reprinted in its entirety in Wang Pfo-leng, pp. 209-214); and
Wang Chih chuan, an early biography reprinted in Hsiian-lan-t1 ang
ts'ung-shu hstl-chi (1947), volume 15, and virtually identical with a
narrative entitled ChTin-huo Wang Chih found in ChTou-hai tTu-pien,
9. 24a-29b.
19O See the biography of Hu Tsung-hsien in Mng-shih, 205. 8a-14a.
20, See the biography of Yen Sung in Mng-shih, 308.10a-17b; and
that by K, W. So in Draft Mng Biographies, no. 9 (1968).
21. Hsia Hsieh, chttan 60 (vol. 3, p. 2327).
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22. See the biographies of Yttan O and Ytl Ta-yu in Ming-shih,
205.13b-14a and 2l2.1a-8b. Also see Ytfan Ofs letter to Hu Tsung-
hsien during the siege of Tfung-hsiang, reproduced in TsTai Chiu-te?s
Wo-pien shih-ltieh (Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu tzu-liao tsTung-shu ed.;
reprint, volume 15, pp. 69-117), pp. 101-102 • Yd Ta-yu, an excellent
subject for a biographical study, had a record of successful "pacification"
of rebellious southwestern aborigines prior to serving in Chekiang and
in 1555 cautiously advised Supreme Commander Chang Ching against
attacking marauders too hastily. But in 1557 he vigorously opposed
proposals to appease Wang Chih with trading opportunities.
23. The basic sources on Wang Chih and the campaign against him
are those mentioned in note 18 above, especially Wang Chih chuan and
Fu Wei-lin, chtlan 162, pp. 3213-3217. Also see the biography of Hu
Tsung-hsien in Ming-shih, 205. 8a-14a; and Ryusaku Tsunoda, translator,
Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories; Later Han through Ming
Dynasties (ed. by L. Carrington Goodrich; South Pasadena, 1951),
pp. 128-137. /
24. For the general nature .of the Ming military establishment, see
C. O . Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty,"
pp. 56-63; Romeyn Taylor's "Yttan Origins of the Wei-so System" in
Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies (ed. by CO. Hucker;
New York, 1969), pp. 23-40; and James F. Millinger, pp. 14-19.
25. For military organization in Chekiang in the 1550Ts see James
F. Millinger, pp. 26-40; ChTou-hai tTu-pien, 5. 8a-17b; and Fan Laifs
Liang-Che hai-fang lei-kTao hsft-pien, chtian 2.
26. ChTou-hai tTu-pien, 5. lla-17b.
27. See Li Kuang-mingTs special study of this practice, cited in
note 1 above.
28. ChTou-hai t'u-pien, 5.11a-17b.
29. Mao Kfun, Chi chiao Hstt Hai pen-mo (Mao Lu-men hsien-sheng
wen-chi, Wan-li ed., 30. 20a-30b), 30. 20a-b. For Tsung Li, see his
brief biography in Ming-shih, 205. 9b.
30. See the biographies of Kuei Yu-kuang and Tfang Shun-chih in
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Ming-shih,' 287. 20b-2lb, 205. 20b-22b. Also see Wu Ytt-nien for Ming
writings on Wako activities in the Southeast.
31. See note 1 above,
32. See the biography of Mao KTun in Ming-shih, 287.12b-13a.
His chronicle of the campaign against Hstl Hai is known generally by
the title Hsti Hai pen-mo. The text primarily cited in this article,
titled Chi chiao Hstl Hai pen-mo, appears in the Wan-li edition of Mao's
collected works, Mao Lu-men hsien-sheng wen-chi, 30. 20a-3Ob. Other
early texts occur in ChTou-hai tTu-pien, 9.12a-19a; and Chekiang tTung-
chih (attributed to the sponsorship of Hu Tsung-hsien; preface dated
1561), 60. 2lb-25a. The work has been reptxblished in such collectanea
as Chieh-ytieh shan-fang hui-chfao, Tse-ku-chai chTung-chTao, and
Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu tzu-liao tsTung-shu. See bibliographic
discussions in Wu Yti-nien, p. 242; and in Wolfgang Franke, p. 223.
33. Tsfai Chiu-te is sometimes referred to as Sung jjt Chiu-te
or as Chû jL Chiu-te. His chronicle, reportedly based on government
files, is known as Wo-pien shih-ltieh. The text cited in this article
appears in Chung-kuo li-shih yen-chiu tzu-liao tsTung-shu, volume 15,
pp. 69-117. It also appears in such collectanea as Yen-i chih-lin,
Sheng-chTao i-shih, and TsTung-shu chi-chTeng chTu-pien. See biblio-
graphic discussions in Wu Yti-nien, pp. 235-236; and in Wolfgang
Franke, p. 223.
34. The 1940 photolithographic reprint is the edition of Shih-tsung
shih-lu cited in this article. Other materials relied upon include the
biography of Hu Tsung-hsien in Ming-shih, 205. 8a-14a; Hsia HsiehTs
Ming tTung-chien; Ku Ying-tfaifs Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo, chttan
55; and Wang Chih chuan.
35. Mao K!un (30. 20b) suggests that Hu personally took up a
defensive position at the Grand Canal town TTang-chTi near Chia-
hsing.
36. Tsfai Chiu-te, pp. 98-99.
37. Shih-tsung shih-lu, 434.7a.
38. Mao KTun, 30. 22a.
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39. Mao KTun, 30.24a. The text indicates that troops were
ordered from Chia-hsing to Tou-men^-^^. Tou-men is a common
place name. There are several places in Chekiang so named, but I
have not yet identified the place that is meant here.
40. TsTai Chiu-te, pp. 101-102. Cf, Wu ChTung-han, p. 69.
41. Mao Kfun, 30. 22b.
42. Shih-tsung shih-lu, 435.5b.
43. Shih-tsung shih-lu, 435.3a-b; Ku Ying-t'ai, chttan 55 (section
8, p. 53).
44. TsTai Chiu-te, p. 102.
45. Mao K'un reports that Hstt Hai and ChTen Tung withdrew
separately from T'ung-hsiang but gives no details about their routes
of withdrawal. Tsfai Chiu-te (pp. 102-103) is followed here, although
his report is not wholly clear.
46. TsTai Chiu-te, p. 102; Ku Ying-tfai, chttan 55 (section 8, p. 54).
47. See Fu Wei-lin, 162.3216; Wang Chih chuan (unpaged).
48. Shih-tsung shih-lu, 437.1a-b; Hsia Hsieh, chttan 61 (vol. 3,
pp. 2358-2359).
49. Ts?ai Chiu-te, p. 102.
50. Shih-tsung shih-lu, 436.2b.
51. Mao KTun, 30. 25a-b. TsTai Chiu-te reports that the marauders
comprised three distinct groups: one led by Hstt Hai, one led by Hung
Tung-kang i^-^/JJ and others, and a third led by ChTen Tung, Yeh Ma,
and others (pp. 102-103). Tsfai also gives the impression that Hstt
Hai arranged for this Hung Tung-kang to be taken into custody (p. 105),
not supporting Mao KTunfs report that the "Hung" in question was Hstt
HaiTs younger brother, thus Hstt Hung. I find no support for TsTai?s
version of this incident in other sources, and no references elsewhere
to anyone named Hung Tung-kang.
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53. Tsfai Chiu-te, pp. 104-105; Mao Krun, 30.25b.
54. Mao KTun, 30. 26b.
55. Mao KTun, 30. 27a. TsTai Chiu-te suggests that the idea of
baiting the marauders with boats may have originated with Hsti Hai
himself (p. 104).
56. Mao Krun, 30.27a.
57. Mao K!un, 30. 27a-b; Ts!ai Chiu-te, p. 107; Shih-tsung shih-lu,
437.3b-4a.
58. Mao Kfun, 30. 27b-28a. Cf. Ku Ying-tTai, chtlan 55 (section
8, p. 54).
59. Tsfai Chiu-te, pp. 107-108.
60. Mao Kfun, 30. 28a.
61. I have not been able to determine the precise location of the
estate called Shen-chia-chuang or, sometimes, Shen-chuang. The
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SU-CHOU AND THE AGENTS OF WEI CHUNG-HSIEN, 1626
INTRODUCTION
K'ai-tu chTuan-hsin ffilfTif jj is a narrative account of a popular
uprising that occurred in the Chinese city of Su-chou in the spring of
1626 on the occasion of the promulgation of an order for the arrest of
the scholar-official Chou Shun-ehfang/fj "/§ $ (1584-1626). This was
not one of the numerous "peasant rebellions" that marked the final
fifteen years of Ming rule and that are now attracting attention among
the mainland Chinese. It was, rather, a spontaneous demonstration,
by literati and commoners alike and in one of the wealthiest and most
populous metropolitan centers of Ming China, in defense of a member
of the official class who had been doomed to die because of his obstinate
adherence to Confucian morality, and in defiance of a ruthless and
heterodox clique that had usurped imperial authority and disrupted the
processes and principles of traditional Confucian politics.
In 1626 Chinese political morality was at one of its lowest ebbs.
On the throne at Peking was an incompetent 21-year-old Emperor,
known to history primarily by his temple name Hsi Tsung (reigned
1620-1627). Much too occupied with puttering at carpentry to pay
attention to the government, he had gladly permitted his governess, one
Madame K ' o ^ ^ (d. ca. 1627), to install her favorite, the illiterate
and unscrupulous eunuch Wei Chung-hsien^jklljj* (1568-1627), 2 in posts
of the greatest trust and responsibility within the palace; and Wei,
through the most brutal terrorism, had made himself undisputed master
of the imperial household and the sole instrument through which imperial
authority was transmitted to the vast bureaucratic mechanism that
administered China.
Within the bureaucracy itself an intense partisan struggle had been
in progress for more than twenty years. On one side was a large group
of men known to their friends as "advocates of righteousness" (chTing-i)
and at least to their enemies as the Eastern Forest Party (Tung-lin tang)
because of their connections with an Eastern Forest Academy (Tung-lin
4L
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shu-yUan), who on the whole stood for integrity and justice in govern-
ment. Opposing them, a consortium of partisan cliques had attached
itself to a succession of Grand Secretariat ministers and opportunist-
ically practised a sort of government by crony,3 In 1621, after the
death of the antagonistic Emperor Shen Tsung (reigned 1572-1620), ^
the "advocates of righteousness" had gained control of the most important
high-level government offices. But their outspoken attacks on the
rising Wei Chung-hsien and the machinations of their dispossessed or
about-to-be-dispossessed enemies had given the so-called "traitor
eunuch" cause and opportunity to extend his influence from the palace
into the civil administration. The long partisan struggle thereupon
reached an undreamed-of climax in 1625 and 1626 when "advocates of
righteousness" were systematically dismissed, "erased from the rolls"
and thus deprived of their official status and prerogatives, and in some
instances cruelly put to death.
The arrest of Chou Shun-c|itang in the spring of 1626 was one of a
long series of injustices committed by Wei Chung-hsien and his hench-
men. Chou^ was a native of Wu, one of three districts with headquarters
in the city of Su-chou, the center of Su-chou prefecture. Su-chou in
turn was an acknowledged center of the rich and influential area around
modern Shanghai known as "the southeast" or as Chiang-nan, whose
literati were the core of the "advocates of righteousness" and suffered
most under WeiTs purges, Chou won his doctoral degree (chin-shih) in
1613, served until 1619 in prefectural duties in Fukien province, and
then held a succession of posts in the Ministry of Civil Service at the
capital, becoming in the end vice-director (ytlan-wai-lang) of the
Ministry's Department of Civil Selections. A stickler for honesty, he
tried to inject his own austere and incorruptible spirit into the process
by which official appointments were distributed*6 It has been said
that he hated evil as a personal enemy;7 and, though he perhaps could
not originally have been considered an active member of the Eastern
Forest Party, he did find that his views were congenial with those of
the active Eastern Forest partisans with whom he came in contact. 8
In 1622, before the rise of Wei Chung-hsien to complete power, Chou
returned to his home on extended leave of absence. It was while living
at home, as the following text relates, that he became overtly critical
of the eunuch and his clique, with the result that his arrest was ordered.
Despite the disturbance that attended this event, Chou in the end was
taken under custody to the capital, imprisoned, tortured, and secretly
put to death.
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The narrative that is translated in full in the following pages,
KTai-tu chTuan-hsin or The True Story of the Promulgation, is the most
comprehensive extant account of the incident at Su-chou. It appears
in Sung-tTien lu-pi (chtian 22, pp. la-14b, among addenda), a source
book on the anti-Wei Chung-hsien struggle that was edited by the Su-
chou commoner Chin Jih-sheng %-$-j\ (fl. in the 1620Ts and 1630Ts)
and published in 24 chtian in the ChTung-chen period (1628-1644); the
preface is dated 1629. An identical text, but lacking the postface that
is appended to the Sung-tTien lu-pi text (14b-15a), occurs in the old
manuscript collection H-tsTe ts'ung-shuoffi^jtfjf, (volume 13, pp. 15a-
27a), which may have been compiled before the fall of the Ming dynasty
in 1644. ^ A third version, also lacking the postface and otherwise
greatly abridged, occurs in Ssu-chTao ta-cheng lu (2. 28a-34b), an
account of late Ming partisan struggles that was compiled by Liu
Hsin-hsiieh %tys% (1599-1674) and published in two chtian in 1831.
The translation given here is of the Sung-tTien lu-pi text but does not
include the postface.
Identity of the author of KTai-tu chTuan-hsin has not been generally
agreed upon, but there appears to be a strong probability that it is the
work of Wen Chen-hengjC ^ % (1585-1645), a resident of Su-chou, a
friend of Chou Shun-chTang, and, as eyewitnesses testify, an active
participant in the uprising described. This being the case, this textfs
lengthy discussion between Wen Chen-heng himself and the authorities
in charge of the promulgation ceremony, which in any case would be
suspect because of its unsupported glorification of Wen, can hardly
be considered credible. -^ Nevertheless, that KTai-tu chTuan-hsin is
in other regards a reasonably reliable account of the Su-chou uprising
and the events that immediately preceded and followed it is substantiated
by comparison with other sources relevant to the incident. Among
these are accounts by proved eyewitnesses such as Yin Hsien-chTen^£/|j£
g[ (d. 1645),n Chu Tsu-wen ^ t f i (d- ^26),12 and Yang Tfing-shu^|
j£- $0* (1595-1647);13 accounts by contemporary Su-chou residents
such as the aforementioned Chin Jih-sheng, *4 Chang Shih-wei / ^ # </|
(1568-1641), 15 (who might have been eyewitnesses,) and Yao Hsi-meng
-$(f $ j i (1579-1636);16 a contemporary account by an author identified
only as "the wave minister of the five lakes" (j& it^>M^ ) that quite
possibly is an eyewitness account;17 and official reports submitted to
the capital by the authorities concerned, themselves eyewitnesses. *8
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These and other materials have been drawn upon freely to authenticate,
broaden, or clarify the following K'ai-tu chTuan-hsin narrative in notes
or, in cases of interesting variations of detail, in parenthetical insertions
into the body of the translation.
* * *
KfAI-TU CH'UAN-HSIN*
At the time of the arrest of Wei Ta-chung $% k f (1575-1625),19
the former Ministry of Civil Service departmental vice-director Chou
Shun-chfang was living at home in Wu-men (i. e . , Su-chou). Shun-chTang
had long enjoyed a great reputation for purity and resoluteness, and his
whole life had been devoted to loyalty and patriotism. When Ta-chung
passed through Wu, Shun-chang treated him cordially and through suc-
cessive days was constantly in his company. In parting, he wept bit-
terly and betrothed his daughter to fVei's) grandson; and when mention
was made of the new influence of the inner court (i.e., the palace eunuchs),
he "viciously gnashed his teeth and vigorously cursed, while everyone
stared.
As always when the traitor-eunuch (Wei Chung-hsien) sent out
guardsmen (t'i-ch'i i£ jra* , i. e. , members of the Imperial Guard,
Chin-i wei), men had been sent along behind to spy in their wake. They
saw Shun-ch'ang grasping hands and being affectionate with Ta-chung.
And when, because the delay had become so extended, the guardsmen
urged Ta-chung along and spoke disrespectfully to Shun-chfang, Shun-
ch'ang in wide-eyed indignation abused them, saying: fTDonTt you know
there are men in the world who aren't afraid to die? You go back and
tell Chung-hsien that I am the former Ministry of Civil Service depart-
mental vice-director Chou Shun-chTang!n Then he called out the name of
Chung-hsien and cursed it ceaselessly. Observers gaped at one another
and put out their tongues in astonishment, and his words were reported
to Chung-hsien.
Later (Wei) Ta-chung was sent to prison. The censor Ni Wen-
huan <f $£ j t i'x (chin-shih 1619) then impeached Shun-eh*ang because of the
marriage agreement, and he was erased from the rolls (i. e., deprived
of his status and prerogatives as an official). %®
£The "wave minister of the five lakes" reports: "It had happened
*The translator gladly acknowledges indebtedness to his friends Mr. Chao
Pao-chfu and Professor Hiraoka Takeo for many suggestions that enhanced
his understanding of this text; but he accepts full responsibility for the
translation offered.
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that the vice-prefect Yang Chiang\%^ , 2 l because he obstinately
refused to cooperate with the eunuch supervisor of textile
manufactures, Li Shih^-^ (ca. 1570-ca. 1636), 2 2 was falsely
memorialized about and dismissed from office. Tradition was
that eunuchs did not impeach functionaries of prefectures and
districts or encroach upon the authority of governors and
provincial inspectors. But when (Chou^l]) Chfi-yttan;|/iL (1572-
1626), 2 who was governor, attempted to defend (Yang), ChTi-ytian
himself was also dismissed. On the day when he departed from
Wu, Shun-chfang as a parting gift to him wrote an essay of
several hundred words dripping with lamentations, in which he
made critical references (to Wei Chung-hsien) without the
slightest concealment. 2^ Thus he, too, aroused the hatred of
Chung-hsien. Instructions were given to the new governor, Mao
I-lu^ *" *fr (chin-shih 1604), 25 secretly to spy around. Shun-chTang
put an end to all his interventions and pleadings; he remained in
solitude and took no part in affairs. His house of a few rafters
in a winding lane merely sheltered his body from wind and rain,
and he ate poor-quality rice. His wife, Madame Wu^ fa, had
never been accustomed to gold or pearls; she only possessed one
or two silver hairpins, and for the better part of a year they had
been in a pawnshop. Therefore, no flaw could ever be found in
him. The (Wei Chung-hsien) partisan Ni Wen-huan was urged
to impeach him. Having no evidence, he made inquiries of (ChouTs)
fellow-townsman So-and-so. This So-and-so, who had been
disposed of in the merit evaluations but remained in the capital,
had once been reproved by Shun-chTang. Thinking of revenge, he
fabricated evidence and offered it; and then Shun-chTang was
erased from the rolls. " (TTi-chTi chi-ltleh, pp. 26b-27a.) ]
Chung-hsienTs hatred was not yet exhausted. Before this, the
censor serving as provincial inspector at Wu [i. a., Hsli Chi 4£4t
(chin-shih 1616)3 and the censor-in-chief (chung-chTeng) serving
as governor of Wu, Mao I-lu, both held grudges against Shun-chTang
because of breaches in courtesy. And when the former governor Chou
Chfi-ytian impeached a censorial superviser of military defenses26 for
requesting leave of absence on a false pretext of illness and it was
ordered that ChTi-ytlan himself be erased from the rolls, they then said
the memorial had actually been written by Shun-chfang. Thereupon the
eunuch superviser of textile manufactures, Li Shih, retroactively
accused Ch!i-yttan of having reduced, on his own authority, the
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originally-prescribed quota of cloth for imperial gowns and of having
obstructed transportation. Moreover, he said that, under the pretext
of studying the Tao, he had gathered associates and friends about him
in a partisan faction; that Chou Tsung-chien^ %^ (1582-1626), 2 7
^ %$% 2 8
 ; ^ ( )
Miao ChTang-chTi.^  (1562-1626), 2 8 Chou Shun-chTang, Kao
Pfan-lung(|i|*|f (1562-1626),
 2 9 Li Ying-sheng^y^^- (1593-1626), 3 0
and Huang Tsun-su-^ ^% (1584-1626), 31 sought favors from him; and
the people of Wu were gnashing their teeth in profound anger. 2
Even before, because of a memorial by the Shansi governor, KTo
ChTang iif/j<5 (chin-shih 1604), regarding the banishment of Chang Shen-
yen/j| 'J5j[ ^ (1568-1646) to frontier military service, Chung-hsien had
already said in a forged rescript: "Chou Tsung-chienTs bribery
plunder is wantonly excessive. The governor and the provincial
inspector were to conduct an investigation, but after a long time there
has been no memorial in reply and, moreover, he is allowed to roam
about at leisure without a care. And Miao ChTang-chfi, though already
erased from the rolls and stripped of his honors, still wears official
robes, carries yellow parasols, and accumulates hangers-on in his
private residence. Let guardsmen arrest them both for trial ."3 3
When (Li) ShihTs memorial was submitted, Chung-hsien made
further plots. Ts'ui Ch'eng-hsiu J | ^ (chin-shih 1613, d.1627)34
and others said: "If they are not all arrested, authority cannot be
established. " Thereupon he further ordered the arrest of Ch'i-ytlan
and the others, five men in all. 3 5
As regards the memorial submitted by (Li) Shih: When he arrived
at Wu from Che (-ehiang), it was rumored, the censor-in-chief set
forth a feast to entertain him, with several hundred kinds of sea and
land delicacies. Shih never once touched them with his chopsticks and
the censor-in-chief was quite abashed. Only when, at last, he took
one sip of tea did the censor-in-chief, relieved, bring up the matter of
Shun-chTang. Moreover, he implicated two or three other officials
from Wu, wishing to trap all in one net. But Shih had heard only of
Chung-hsienrs hatred for Shun-ch'ang and therefore dared not involve
others.
(On the other hand,) some say that the memorial was prepared in
ShihTs name in the inner court, that neither Shih nor the censor-in-chief
had any part in it, and that the matter was so secret that no one knew of
it. 36
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During this period guardsmen, relying upon (public dread of) Chung-
hsien, all became abusive and arrogant. Wherever they went prefects
and magistrates prepared official residences and food for them; and
lesser local officials who in the slightest regard did not meet with their
approval were forthwith given official beatings. (The guardsmen) even
treated governors as equals without engaging in courtesies, and
governors behaved toward them with deference. From the families of
the victims of their arrests they demanded money by the thousands
(of taels), utterly ruining them.
(Mao) Chfang-chfi and (Chou) Tsung-chien had not been gone three
days when other guardsmen arrived in Wu to arrest Shun-chrang.
The hubbub in Wu reached a climax.
{Chang Shih-wei reports: "In their hearts everyone knew
that (the arrest of Chou Tsung-chien) was the doing of the
traitor Wei, that in court he had ordered the arrest and trial.
Everyone was very agitated. Subsequently there was not a
day when they did not alarm one another about arrests by
the guardsmen. They would say: TOn such a day at such a
time they will come again!1 They also said: T On such a day
they will come to arrest So-and-so 1T In general, all those
TSo-and-so?sT whose arrests were rumored were men who
were currently renowned for loyalty but had been erased
from the rolls. Moreover, it was thought: rThe traitor Wei
is going to do as he likes, and with his various villains he
plots to kill off all those in the empire who do not toady to
him so that afterwards he might monopolize power.T They
talked with a great clamor and pointed to the vice censor-in-
chief Chou (Tsung-chien) as evidence. They also said:
'When the vice censor-in-chief reached such-and-such a
place, he was put to death with poison, and his corpse was
abandoned in such-and-such a place. In short, when there
is a forged edict there is no waiting for imprisonment and
trial.T Many people believed all this. " (Chou Li-pu chi-shih,
pp. 8b-9a. 3
Shun-chfang, while living at home, enjoyed going before the govern-
mental authorities on behalf of the common people to cry out for justice
and to restrain oppression; in all lightening of corvee requirements or
delaying of tax collections, it always was Shun-chrang who was in the
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forefront. He associated intimately with poor scholars, praising and
recommending them unstintingly. Consequently, literati and common-
ers alike were profoundly convinced of his virtue; and when suddenly
they learned of the disaster that had come upon him, they were over-
come with outraged anger and wanted to take his place. There was a
great clamor, and everyone blamed the censor-in-chief.
When the news arrived, the day became dark as night; there were
wild winds and furious raina For five days and nights in succession
rain poured down. On level ground water became several feet deep!
Shun-ch!ang lived on a winding lane outside the city wall, in desolate
surroundings behind a poor wicker gate. When the order (for his arrest)
arrived at Wu, the district magistrate ChTen Wen-jui F&3L$JQ (chin-shih
1625), who had long and highly esteemed Shun-chfang, ^8 dismissed his
attendants and, braving the rain, went in the night to tell him about it.
Shun-chTangTs countenance did not change. They sat and chatted for a
long time, and then the magistrate asked Shun-chTang to go in and
prepare his baggage,
[(bhang Shih-wei reports: "(When the magistrate arrived,)
Li-pu ("the Ministry of Civil Service, " i .e . , Chou Shun-chfang)
said with spirit: TI have been prepared for arrest for a long time!
But I regret that because I have been erased from the rolls I
am unable to appeal and in the presence of the Emperor unfold
what I would like to say. If a prisoner might memorialize, I
might be able to denounce those in power so that the various
villains might know that loyal men in the world cannot all be
murdered. Then even death might be assuaged in one's
glorification. m (Chou Li-pu chi-shih, pp. 9a-9b.)]
Shun-chfang since leaving office had liked to study calligraphy, and
he was so fond of inscribing things for others that he never tired. When
he went in and looked over his documents, he moistened a pen and wrote
an inscription for a monk. 39 jjis wife and children all wept in a circle
before him, but Shun-chfang was unmoved and in his conversation
never alluded to any personal matter.
At dawn Shun-chTang watched the magistrate consume two bowls of
congee. Only then did he change into prisoners garb. Sedan-chair
bearers were called, and he got in. The road was blocked by those who
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watched, and all wept until they lost their voices.
When he had entered the yamen to await orders, from the governor's
palace near the yamen the censor-in-chief secretly sent a man to spy
around. He saw that the common people, young and old alike, were
arriving in swarms, all wishing to get a glimpse of Chou Li-pu (i. e.,
"Chou of the Ministry of Civil Service"), Some cursed, and some
prayed. Those who cursed called the censor-in-chief a traitor-partisan.
Students^ in their (formal-dress) green collars ran about in the mud
and mire. From dawn till midday and on into afternoon the streets
were solidly filled.
The censor-in-chief, fearful, instructed the district magistrate to
ask Shun-chTang to another yamen in the district for drink, food, and
bathing. The literati and commoners all followed. The yamen being
too small to admit them, they all became rain-soaked in the courtyard;
but talk about their leaving was not to be endured.
£TThe wave minister of the five lakes" reports: "The
governor, estimating that popular feelings could not be re-
strained, ordered the local authorities repeatedly to move
Shun-chTang about. In one day he was moved four or five
times. Far and near there was increased agitation, so that
the alleys were choked and the roads blocked. Carriers of
burdens rested their shoulders, and shopkeepers closed their
businesses. In tens and hundreds they formed into groups,
running about to make inquiries, or weeping, or angrily
cursing, or smiting their foreheads and imploring heaven,
or paying for divination to determine good and evil omens.
White-haired elders, weeping, said to one another: fWhy
should the court put a good man to death?1 Others replied:
TWhat has this to do with the court? Of course, it is merely
that the eunuch Wei wants to kill him.f Some said: fWe are
mean fellows. Why do we shrink so from our own deaths
that we do not beg for the life of Ii-pu?f Some prepared grief-
filled pleas and submitted them to the authorities. Some
wished hurriedly to pack and go to the capital to ask for
justice. There were those who, though not familiar with
Li-puTs face, on getting one look at him knocked their heads
as if gazing upon some auspicious omen. Those who crowded
around blocking the way so that no one could go forward called
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out his name from outside the gate and repeatedly paid him
homage. All sighed and sobbed; tears flowed freely. They
could not bear to leave: they went out by (early morning)
starlight and returned home (at night) by starlight. From the
fifteenth day to the eighteenth day (i. e., from April 11 to
April 14, 1626) the whole region was as disrupted as if (every-
one) were rushing to the assistance of distressed parents.rt
(TTi-chTi chi-liieh, pp. 27b-28b9]J
Jchang Shih-wei reports: nAt first Li-pu was lodged in
the district yamen. The crowd followed him to the district
yamen and every day stood there talking by the thousands
and hundreds. They talked about loyalty in ancient and
modern times and urged on laggards not to mind appearances.
Those who emerged from interviews said that Li-pu not
only had overcome fear but also was not bitterly wrathful;
that, merely because of his breast's being full of pure sin-
cerity, he shone like a flash of lightning or fire struck from
a flint. Nevertheless, he denounced the eunuch increasingly.rT
(Chou Li-pu chi-shih, p. 9b. |J
Shun-chTangTs family was bitterly poor and lacked even a single
picul of stored supplies; yet the guardsmen intimidated it ceaselessly.
Shun-chfang, however, swore that he would not give them a single
coin. Thereupon the literati and commoners all wished to pour out
their possessions in his aid. Even those who ordinarily lacked good
principles begrudged nothing, and there even were some who left
money and departed without mentioning their names. Poor scholars
borrowed against their tutorial salaries and, that being thought
insufficient, handed over their poor clothes to pawnshops, and the
little that they obtained they forthwith presented as gifts. The guards-
men, learning of this, ever-increasingly yearned to fill up their
purses. Only after lingering for three days did they issue their
summons.
On this day it again rained heavily. After the crowd had heard the
summons, Shun-chTang was put into a caged cart. The whole city went
along, everyone escorting him carrying incense. Smoke billowed up to
obscure heaven, and the sound of the crying out for justice reverberated
for several tens of miles (ii). As the district magistrate accompanied
Shun-ch'ang out of the district yamen, the crowd blocked the way so
51
that the cart could not go forward. Shun-chrang lifted up its screen
and persuasively said: ffI am deeply moved that my fathers and brothers
covet me and wish to retain me a little while. But it is the law of the
state! It cannot be delayed for a moment! My fathers and brothers, let
us here say goodbye!" At this, the crowd grieved even more. From
the district yamen to the guardsmenfs compound4-1- was a distance of
not one mile (li), but every few steps the crowd hindered them so that
they could not proceed, and only after a long while did they get through.
f'The wave minister of the five lakes" reports: "Those
among the students who knew him made plans with one another,
saying: TThe people are indeed angry. What will happen when
(the edict) is opened and read cannot be foretold. Let us, on
his behalf, request that grief not be inflicted on the whole area.
Then, together with two or three elders, they went everywhere
consoling the common people, saying: fThe court and the
sagely-wise ruler all consider Li-pu to be loyal and patriotic
and wish that he live. If we wish to plan for Li-puTs safety,
we must instantly beg for his life before the two dignitaries
(i. e., the censor-in-chief/governor and the censor/provincial
inspector,) but being careful not to go to excess and cause
trouble.T The common people all said: TAgreed!T Thereupon
all went carrying incense from Wu district to the guardsmenTs
compound. Those who accompanied Shun-chTang were several
tens of thousands. Their weeping and wailing shook heaven,
and their wiping away of tears formed rain. The horses of the
district officials were unable to go forward. The day had
reached noon; lowering clouds were black and ugly, mixed
with flying frost. There was not a man whose heart and
spirit were not agitated and downcast.fT (TTi-chTi chi-ltieh,
p, 28b.3
After arriving at the guardsmen1 s compound, the crowd increased.
The gates not yet having been opened, and the compound being close
against the city wall, a crowd climbed atop the wall and stood round on
the parapets, which all became filled. Incense burned in the rain like
an array of torches. When men atop the wall called out, men below the
wall answered; and when men below the wall called out, then men atop
the wall similarly answered. The noise became increasingly thunderous.
Shun-chfang himself was taken by surprise and with the utmost respect
requested that they disperse. But the crowd did not make a move.
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Meantime, teachers and elders had all assembled, and some proposed
going to the capital to submit memorials demanding justice for Shun-
chTang.
The battalion commanders and the guardsmen of the Imperial
A O
Guard, inside the compound, were all terrified and wished to urge
the censor-in-chief to enter and augment their strength. Meanwhile
the superviser of defenses Chang Hsiao $dt- , the prefect KTou Shen
% •$ (chin-shih 1616), and the magistrate (ChTen) Wen-jui, all of
whom in their hearts recognized the injustice being done Shun-chTang,
looked at one another with grieved countenances. The panic in the
people1 s minds had previously been reported to the provincial inspector,
Hstt Chi. When the censor (i.e., Hstt Chi) arrived, his front-runners
shouted to clear the way as in ordinary times. But when the censor
saw the scene he was shocked and warned them not to clear the people
away. As soon as the censor-in-chief arrived, the crowd thrice
cried out "An unequalled injustice!" They all repeatedly echoed it.
To the left of the compound gate had been placed seats for the two
dignitaries. Some students were going to wait until (the dignitaries)
entered and sat down facing the prefect and the magistrate; then they
wished to make a request that they prostrate themselves before the
throne and submit memorials. But the censor-in-chief wished abruptly
to terminate the affair. As soon as he arrived he ordered the gates
opened, and literati and commoners promptly swarmed inside.
Now the rain lessened and stopped, but the ground was a mire of
mud, knee-deep. The students entirely disregarded it. Having
entered, they gazed up at the screens and insignia set up on the plat-
form. The two Imperial Guard officers stood like sentinels in their
black uniforms, gazing in all directions as haughtily as if no one were
near. Below them had been set up some manacling instruments, and
there the victim of arrest lay prostrate. The students were increas-
ingly overcome with indignation. Some gazed up toward heaven and
issued long wails, and others called upon TTai Tsu Kao Huang Ti (the
eunuch-hating founder of the Ming dynasty). Their words were a
jumble that could not be distinguished. But there still was none who
spoke out firmly to state their complaint.
When the two dignitaries came inside, one student, Wen Chen-heng,
greeted them and said: "Today, when the feelings of the people and the
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minds of the literati are such as this, can you honorable gentlemen alone
not keep the historians in mind so as to glorify yourselves ?" The
censor-in-chief knit his brows and said: MI always think of such things,
but today what can be done?" The student said: "This is the plan for
today: We request that the opening and reading (of the edict) be delayed
and that you honorable gentlemen report the true facts to the Emperor,
stating that the literati and people urgently cry out for no other reason
than that they wish to pray for the vast and magnificent imperial mercy
in order that Li-pu might be turned over to the governor and the pro-
vincial inspector for investigation. If there is evidence that he has
sought favors, then let him be arrested and put to death forthwith, and
there will be no remorse.ft
The censor-in-chief had absolutely no intention of permitting this,
but because the statement was just, he feigned a cordial manner and
said: "To submit memorials on behalf of Li-pu would indeed be proper.
But you students have not yet given this thorough consideration. The
imperial anger being so great, if memorials are submitted, can they
guarantee that he will be aided?" The student said: "Certainly, if it
were a question of the imperial anger, then how could it be shirked?
But nowadays edicts are actually forged by Chung-hsien, so that he
might murder worthy literati and officials of the empire to satisfy his
own personal anger. Chung-hsienTs poison flows not only to one region,
and disaster is suffered not only by one man! Li-pu, especially, is one
to whom we students have long submitted our hearts. And when we
actually see that it is merely because of talk (not actual deeds) that he
has come to disaster, we do not shrink from the axes and choppers in
begging for his life. If now a memorial is submitted, and if you honor-
able gentlemen will kindly tell the whole story, we may be fortunate
enough to obtain what we request; and then the time of Li-puT s re-birth
will be a time when (the memory of) you honorable gentlemen will
become imperishable. And even if we do not obtain what we request,
even so, your moral uprightness will be preserved in men's minds
deathlessly. Can you honorable gentlemen not hold back even this
single advocate of righteousness so as to humble the scoundrel1 s gall
and make him know what he must shrink from?"
The censor-in-chief had no response to offer. He only said: "You
students all study and emulate Confucius. Have you not heard that in
the ruler-subject relationship there is actually no place of escape? Now
the edict is here; that is, the ruler-father is here! How can gathering
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in crowds and raising a clamor be the proper conduct of subjects?7
The student said: "How can it be merely ^question of) an imperial
edictTs being here? Take the imperial ancestors as a practical model!
When Chung-hsien!s forgeries and usurpations can be seen to have
reached this extreme, he should immediately be put to death! In for-
mer days we students certainly served the honorable gentleman with
respect; and if by obeying your instructions we should win insignificant
places on the jade staircase (before the throne), we would certainly
remonstrate unto death about affairs such as to day?s. How could re-
sisting the imperial wrath be the responsibility of other men? How
could the honorable gentleman teach men to cringe and toady? We
have only listened in the streets and do not entirely know how this
affair originated. Therefore we wish that the honorable gentleman
manage it. This activity today is for your sake, sir, not Li-puTs!"
All this while the censor bent his ear to listen. Noting the
ardor of the student7 s words, he officiously said: T!DonTt you students
clamor so; we must deliberate about bringing affairs to a good end.fT
The censor-in-chief said: "Accordingly, let (the edict) be opened and
read!"
The student said: "Honorable sir, your words are mere mock-
ery. After the opening and reading, it can only be that he will in-
stantly depart; and if he departs, it can only be that he will instantly
die. What can be done than?"
Now the guardsmen looked at one another and whispered: "Who
is this?" They were amazed that the censor-in-chief did not take
punitive action against the student. The student then said to the
censor-in-chief: "We students today have already risked the more.
If you honorable gentlemen sacrifice your offices, and if we students
sacrifice our lives, then there may be unexpected results. Have you
honorable gentlemen not heard of past affairs in Wu? When (the
great eunuch) Wang Chih (fl. in the 1480Ts) was in power, he sent the
eunuch Wang Ching i ,$t by courier service to Wu, and the students
were ordered to copy out unorthodox books. The students did not
obey. Ching ordered the local authorities to arrest them and bring them
to the courier station, wishing to humiliate them; but the students
picked up clubs, sought him out, and attacked him in the street. Ching
fled into hiding, barely escaping with his life. The minister (of war)
Wang Shu^-^f. (1416-1508), who was then governor of Chiang-nan, memo-
rialized and laid the blame on Ching. Ching was punished, and the stu-
dents escaped.43 I have also heard that when (the eunuch) Wang Chen i>if<
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(d. 1449) was in power, he hated the National Academy chancellor Li
Shih-mien j | #f ^ (ca. 1374-1450) because of his obstinate rectitude
and ordered him put in a cangue at the gate of the National Academy.
Several thousand National Academy students went to the palace to get
Chen and have revenge on him. Chen became terrified, and Shih-mien
obtained his release.^* Now these men have let loose a tiger and have
given it wings (i. e., have made it even more dangerous), and have
aroused the anger of the mob to be like (uncontrollable) water and fire.
What can they rely on so as to be unafraid? It is merely for the sake of
you honorable gentlemen that they are protected.Tf
On hearing this the guardsmen all shrank back. But the censor-in-
chief spoke on, saying: "If you wish a memorial to be submitted, you
must wait until I enter my palace and prepare a draft." The student
said: "Once the honorable gentleman has entered his palace would we
students be permitted to see his face again? It is necessary to prepare
the memorial here; that will do.rf
The censor then turned to the censor-in-chief and said with spirit:
"(The great remonstrators of antiquity KuanJI]) Lung-pfang-||i^ 4 5 and
Pi Kan tt-f ,46 after all, were only men. Today we two ought to exert
ourselves! " And the superviser of defenses from the side also vigorous-
ly urged them on. Now there was a thread of hope in the affair!
All the while the two dignitaries and the student were talking to-
gether, back and forth, the crowd encircled them like a wall, listening.
The two dignitaries were standing upright in the mud; their shoulders
jarred together, and they could not even stand steadily on the ground.
They no longer had any dignity of demeanor! There was such a great
clamor that the crowd could not make out what the student and the
dignitaries were saying.
When midday had passed and the guardsmen saw that the delibera-
tion would still not be concluded for a long time, they threw armchains
to the ground with a clanking noise and loudly shouted: "Where is the
prisoner?" The crowd's anger suddenly rose with the force of a
landslide or the crash of waves. Grasping and snapping the (platform)
railings with a wrenching noise, they attacked. In the twinkling of an
eye the guardsmen and the battalion commanders all were clasping their
heads and slinking away to east or west, climbing trees or scrambling
up onto buildings. Some hid in privies. Some concealed themselves
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with brambles. When the crowd caught them, they all smote their
foreheads and begged for their lives. They suffered severe bodily
injuries; not one was able to escape. One clambered over the wall
to get away, but the people outside the wall flogged him still more
mercilessly. Someone kicked him with wooden clogs until his teeth
were knocked into his throat, and he promptly ^?
Now the censor-in-chief, the censor, the supervisor of defenses,
the prefect, and the magistrate no longer consulted one another, and
the students saw that matters were already lost. All scattered to get
away. But amidst the scuffling and confusion the censor-in-chiefTs
secretaries arrived with officers leading mounted troops. One soldier
began threatening with a sword. The crowd was about to wrest away
the sword and use it on the censor-in-chief when the supervisor of
defenses caught the soldier and flogged him to appease the crowd, which
then became somewhat pacified. The prefect (KTou) Shen and the
magistrate (Chfen) Wen-jui, who had long had the peopleTs confidence,
then genially asked them to clear away. The crowd obeyed, and the
censor-in-chief departed. Had it not been for the prefect, the magis-
trate, and the supervisor of defenses, the censor-in-chief might have
been killed that day. All this time the crowd merely gave vent to
spontaneous anger; it had no formulated plan of action. Before anyone
realized it, the affair had got out of control, and no one knew what the
end might be.
CTThe Ying-tTien governor, Mao I-lu, and the provincial
inspector, Hstt Chi, memorialized: fOn the fifteenth day of
the third lunar month of this year (April 11, 1626), on receipt
of an edict to the effect that the traitorous official Chou Shun-
chTang, who had been erased from the rolls and made a com-
moner, was to be arrested, we gave orders by night for the
Su-chou prefect KTou Shen to send the Wu district magistrate
ChTen Wen-jui to take Shun-chfang under arrest to the district
yamen and carefully to guard him pending promulgation (of the
edict). Subsequently we agreed with the imperially-despatched
battalion commanders Chang Ying-lung {jL/fjfjIl and Wen Chih-
ping x Zjt*! of the Imperial Guard to promulgate (the edict)
at noon on the eighteenth day of the same lunar month (April
14). 48 ^ e ^ the appointed time) went together to the
(designated) public office. Along the road literati and com-
moners surged around our vehicles so that we could not proceed,
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and they wrangled so noisily that we could not distinguish what
was being said. After we reached the public office, and just
as we were promulgating (the edict), clamorous literati and
commoners, despite our cries, surged in with intense noise
and great hubbub. Affairs got out of control. We ministers
concealed ourselves in self defense and then led the local
officials threatening them with punishments and awing them with
the imperial authority. But their force, like that of rolling
thunder or flashing lightning, was almost sufficient to snap
trees and lift up poles. Momentarily our hearts and mouths were
entirely devoid of wisdom and courage. We were surrounded
and hemmed in. The screams were indescribable. We were
jostled and struck with great gusto. But we carefully took the
traitorous official Chou Shun-chTang into custody as before
to await being sent away.. . . f" (HTSL 65. 7b. |
CrThe wave minister of the five lakes!t reports: "More than
five hundred students in formal attire awaited the two dig-
nitaries outside the gate, trembling with anxiety and warning
one another not to make a clamor. Soon the two dignitaries
arrived. The common people fell prostrate on the ground,
and their cries were like rolling thunder or a raging torrent,
rumbling so that not a single word could be distinguished.
The students Wang Chieh i % (1599-1660), 49 Liu Yti-i %\m^
(chti-jen 1628), 50 ^ d Wen Chen-heng stepped forward, knelt
down, and said: fChou Li-pu is such a man as can serve as
a model for the literati and people. Suddenly he has found
disfavor with the powerful eunuch. He has not been criticized
by the Censorate or the Offices of Scrutiny, but it is on the
basis of insubstantial complaints by the eunuch Li Shih that
he has been vexed with this edict and the sending of guardsmen.
The common people cry out for justice, ten thousand voices in
unison, and wish to die in his place. We students, in studying
and emulating Confucius and Mencius, have learned about a
good name, purity, honesty, and a sense of shame. But in
present-day affairs, those whom the court casts away are
worthy and excellent, whereas those who are employed are
treacherous and cunning. How can we students have the
countenance any longer in green collars to dwell in so vile a
world? You honorable gentlemen are the most important
ministers in the southeast. If you are unable to propitiate
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heaven and console the hearts of the people, we students
must presume to be ashamed!T When they finished speaking
they wept loudly. Outside the gate all wept until they lost
their voices. Even sedan-chair bearers hid their faces and
were unable to stop lamenting. Flowing perspiration covered
the face of the governor, and he was unable to make any
response. But the guardsmen, with the fierceness of tigers,
came from within carrying weapons to push away the crowd.
In harsh voices they said: TWhen the Secret Service Office
(Tung ch'ang)^ takes a man, how dare rats stick their noses
in?! Thereupon (the commoner) Yen P'ei-wei^flfl/jJ! and others
pushed forward and demanded: TDid this edict issue from the
court or from the Secret Service Office?1 The guardsmen
abused them saying: ! Promptly cut out their tongues! If
edicts did not issue from the Secret Service Office, who would
issue them?1 The commoners, on hearing this, all bared
their arms. They shouted: TWe thought it was an edict from
the Son of Heaven! How is the Secret Service Office able to
arrest our Li-pu!! Forthwith they attacked, rushing by the
thousands to the foot of the platform. Seizing weapons, they
struck out at the guardsmen. For a long time these proud and
overbearing men, surprised beyond all expectation, cowered
in the rear of the hall. Then the commoners followed them in
and could not be checked. More than twenty of the guardsmen
hid behind a partition and jumped over the wall to escape, but
one of the men was killed. The governor was terrified and
urgently groped around for a weapon with which to defend him-
self. One armored man entered brandishing a sword, and the
common people scattered in all directions, crying: !His
Honor has deployed troops who are going to kill us all!T They
tried to outdo one another in throwing tiles and stones, which
were as thick as flying locusts. They were about to panic again
when the supervisor of defenses Chang Hsiao grasped the armored
man and flogged him, whereupon they all settled down. The
prefect K!ou Shen, who had long been popular, again and again
ordered them to clear away. But only deep in the night did they
gradually disperse." (Tyi-chTi chi-ltieh, pp. 29a-30a.)]
[Yin Hsien-chTen reports: "Early on the eighteenth day
(April 14) the guardsmen demanded money even more urgently,
and the crowd became increasingly angry. At this time the sun
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tucked away its brilliance, and a heavy rain filled the air —
as if (heaven) were drinking tears on Chou's behalf. At noon
Chou emerged from the district yamen. Common people
lined the road, holding incense. The sound of the weeping
penetrated the clouds. From the district yamen to the guards-
men1 s compound their shoulders rubbed and their feet touched.
The vehicles of the governor, the provincial inspector, the
prefect, and the district magistrate were unable to proceed.
Wherever they went people blocked the road and cried out:
fWe wish to rescue our Chou!T There even were those who
swore to have vengeance! Then Wang Chi eh, Liu Yti-i, Sha
Shun-ehfen rf$$ , 5 2 Wang Ching-kao-£-f |L , Wen Chen-heng,
Tsou Ku^Jg^ , 5 3 Wu Er-chang^Jjjjl- ,5^ and Chu Tsu-wen
spoke out obstinately before the two dignitaries, begging that
they say something in (ChouTs) defense.55 Their words and
manner were very provocative. Five men in the rear, Yen
P'ei-wei and others, bared their arms and shouted: TIf Chou
should die, the people also would not wish to live!' They
snatched whips from the guardsmen and turned against them.
The guardsmen, terrified, said: TActually, it isnTt an imperial
edict. It merely issued from the gentleman Wei.T The five men,
with flashing eyes, angrily said: TIt actually isnTt the idea of
the Son of Heaven! Let!s all attack these false-edict bearers!T
Thereupon, like the swarming of bees or the gathering of clouds
everyone plucked up his courage and pressed forward. Sub-
sequently there came about an uprising such as a thousand
antiquities never experienced. Meanwhile, Chou prostrated
himself at the middle gate of the yamen and, changing color,
said: f Grants of kindness and cruelty are entirely the pre-
rogatives of the ruler. The common people have gone insane!
My person is not worthy of being begrudged. If calamity is
brought upon the whole area, what will the literati and people
do?* I myself was thinking, moreover, that Chou's punishment
would be increased; from the midst of the crowd I urgently
cried out: ?DonTt!f But I was struck in the face with incense
by madmen and got a good taste of their fists. The affair got
completely out of control, so that law and order could not be
enforced. Consequently there actually was no promulgation. "
(Chou Chung-chieh kung nien-pTu, pp. 18b-19b.j]
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(chin Jih-sheng reports: tTOn the eighteenth (April 14)
Li-pu in prisoner's garb emerged to await promulgation of the
edict. (Yen) Pfei-wei passed around incense and swore oaths
with the crowd. He wept in the marketplace and said: !Those
who wish to protect Chou Li-pu follow me!' A very strong man
with whom he had formerly associated, Ma Chieh,!^^ , had
already in the morning struck a watchman's rattle and cried
out summonses. All at once those who grasped incense and
followed were more than ten thousand men. In the rain it was
like an array of torches. Arriving at the guardsmen's com-
pound, they saw that fetters had been set up, and the manner
of the guardsmen was very arrogant. (Yen P'ei-) wei forthwith
led on to the two dignitaries and complained about the injustice
to Li-pu. He wished to take his place. Yang Nien-ju;£|£.^(* ,
whose former business was selling clothes, and the wholesaler
Shen Yangj^ $£ , although they had long loved righteousness,
had not been acquainted with Li-pu, nor had they been acquainted
with P'ei-wei. But at this time, together with the crowd,
they sought to petition so that (Chou) might escape arrest. The
sound of their weeping was like the collapse of a mountain. At
the corner of the city wall they knelt and begged until noon
without getting up. The guardsmen became angry. Then (Ma)
Chieh from the side bared his arms and cursed Wei Chung-hsien
incessantly. The guardsmen said: 'We will cut out your
tongue!' Then they threw arm-chains down on the steps and
cried loudly: 'Where is the prisoner?' The crowd raised a
great clamor, saying: 'This is a forged edict from the Secret
Service Office; how can it be?' The guardsmen started to clap
Shen Yang into fetters. Li-pu's sedan-chair bearer, Chou
Wen-ytlan )£\ jif^ , who after hearing of (Chou's) disaster had
wept and cursed for three days without eating, now strode for-
ward and snatched away the fetters, and a guardsman injured
him on the forehead. Thereupon the crowd raised a roar like
that of a mountain falling into the sea and fought with the black-
uniformed men. It went beyond all expectations; they were all
injured and scurried away like rats! One man hid in the
rafters of the building, but was in such agitation that he fell,
Nien-ju promptly attacked and killed him. One man, in getting
over the wall, fell to the ground. Someone kicked him in the
brain with wooden clogs, and he also died. The censor-in-chief,
unable to exert control, finally deployed troops to protect
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himself;"56 (Wu-jen chuan, pp. 28a-29a.^J
£kuang YU (?) reports: tT... . It happened to be raining, and
those who had come all had umbrellas and wore wooden clogs.
As their shouts shook the earth, ten thousand wooden clogs
were flung in unison from below the platform.... M (Jen-pien
shu-ltieh, p. 42b,)
When late afternoon came, it happened that guardsmen who were
going to Che (-chiang) to arrest Huang Tsun-su passed beneath the
city wall in boats. On arriving at the courier station, they heard that
in the city there had been an uprising; but, not believing this was so,
they made forcible demands as always. The courier station attendants,
already contemptuous, arrogantly ignored them. The guardsmen
became angry and cursed them. They cursed back. (The guardsmen)
angrily struck them. They struck back. When guardsmen who had
gone into the marketplace to buy wine and meats tried to dictate prices,
the market people also grasped and struck them. Moreover, they ran
around on the city wall, crying: ''More guardsmen have come!M There-
upon the crowd all responded; they went to the Hstî jf-river at the foot of
the city wall, burned the boats, and tossed the baggage into the river.
The imperial warrants that had been given (to the guardsmen) were
consequently lost and could not be located. In great distress, the
guardsmen all struggled across the river to the west bank, but many
farmers on the west bank chased them, using rakes and hoes for clubs.
The guardsmen, born and reared in the north, had never become ac-
customed to water. Clutching bits of wood, they floated several miles
away to a secluded place before daring to emerge. They all suffered
extremely.57
£rThe company commander Chang Kuo-tung/^ /|f] }fc of the
Imperial Guard memorialized: TThis officer and Shih Tsung-
pang ^^4f w e r e leading guardsmen to arrest Huang Tsun-su
when, on passing through the Su-chou region, we learned that
within the city relatives of Chou Shun-chfang had aroused a
rebellion and assembled a crowd. Many persons came out of the
city, obstructed us, rebelliously beat us almost to death, and
tossed us into the river. They also snatched away our imperial
documents and warrants and our clothing and destroyed all.
We were severely injured. We begged the local prefect, one
KTou, to make an investigation, but six guardsmen could not
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be found. We went confusedly on, but when we reached the
P?ing-wang 3f §f bridge we were again attacked by a crowd
of villains. Without a route (by which to proceed), we were
only able to borrow a small boat and flee for our lives.
Having fled into the capital (Nanking?) by little-used routes,
we now report.T?f (HTSL 65. 17a,)]
When the crowd finally scattered, dusk had come. Only with even-
ing did the sky clear; the moonlight was as bright as daylight. The pre-
fect and the district magistrate sent men into the (guardsmen1 s) com-
pound to help up the wounded and bruised from amidst the blood and
flesh. All were gasping for breath, and when they heard a voice of the
slightest harshness they shuddered with fear and implored salvation. The
censor-in-chief then issued orders summoning troops in armor from
the (Su-chou) Guard to surround the compound for protection; and Shun-
chfang in this one night was repeatedly moved from yamen to yamen.
Shun-ch!ang by now lacked any hope of returning alive, and only one
death is sufficient for a thousand eternities!
The next day was clear. The leading personages of Wu, wearing
white mourning clothes because of the extraordinary incident, called on
the two dignitaries and the supervisor of defenses, seeking some means
of restoring peace to the area. The censor-in-chief had already, in the
night, summoned the censor to his palace, and by lamplight they had
drafted a memorial reporting the uprising.58 At the fifth watch they
had hurriedly sent it out. Toward the local personages their attitude
was very hateful. They said: "This rebellious crowd! If you gentlemen
had early issued a single word, they would have been soothed! It seems
to us that you gentlemen actually caused it!"
The memorial having been submitted, they secretly sent word to
the local authorities that they wished to obtain the ringleaders for
retribution. Thereupon, because of suspicions, thirteen men, Yen
PTei-wei and others, were arrested and imprisoned. Case records
were hastily prepared, saying: "Such a one sounded a watchmanTs
rattle and called out summonses;" "such a one distributed incense and
swore oaths with the crowds Tsuch ones are village bullies who assisted
one another in doing evil;" and "the warlike shouts and loud summonses
of such a one were heard far and near." All these things were imaginary
and had not been. At the extreme, there even were various men who
had left (the city ?) beforehand and returned afterwards and yet were
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still seized. In the trials there was not a single word in self-defense.
(The victims) merely said: "When such a worthy as Chou Li-pu comes
to such disaster, we little people must certainly die for him; what more
is to be said?" They all entered prison chatting and laughing.
The censor-in-chief submitted three memorials within ten days,
wishing to exonerate himself through merit in capturing the rebellious
leaders. His memorials were increasingly secret, but censors leaked
out a little of them. He said: "These men all took the lead because of
selfish motives; there was no public indignation. " This was in order
to substantiate (Li Shih's previous) statement that the people of Wu were
gnashing their teeth in profound anger (against Chou and others).60
There was, after all, not a single word about the crying out against
injustice. Everyone said that the censor-in-chiefTs heart had already
been dead for a long time, and the crowd swore to prevent Shun-chfangTs
arrest even to death. Rumors appeared on all sides, and placards were
posted in the thoroughfares, saying that the crowd must die along with
him. Thereupon the prefect and the magistrate both went to Shun-chTang
and plotted to let it be known that he would not be sent away pending
imperial action. But suddenly one night troops were sent out to take up
positions on water and on land, and (Chou) was secretly despatched to
undertake his journey. The battalion commanders and the guardsmen
who were lucky enough to remain alive all were happy to get out the
Chin-chfang^/^] gate6* with their lives. The prefect and the magis-
trate proceeded in a small boat together with Shun-ohTang. Only when
they had crossed the domestic-customs barrier and anchored in a
wilderness did they dare to proclaim the edict. Thus crudely was the
matter terminated. When daylight came and the crowd learned of this,
Shun-chfang was already long gone. 62
Meantime Chung-hsien's spies in Wu hurried along by-roads by
swift night courier to the capital (literally, Chfang-an) to report the
uprising. (The first) said: "Chiang-nan is in revolt! The guardsmen
have all been killed!" The next to arrive said: "Shun-chTang has
been liberated, and flags have been set up over the city gates. The
gates are closed in daylight! " The next to arrive said: "The censor-
in-chief has already been killed! The transport routes have been
blocked and the transport boats plundered. "
Chung-hsien on hearing these things was very frightened. He
blamed (TsTui) Chfeng-hsiu, He made him kneel down and reprimanded
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him, saying: "You told me to arrest all of these five men, and now
rebellion has been aroused in the southeast. The southeast is the area
from which (great) revenues are levied. If they are lost, how can we
later accomplish great things?11 ChTeng-hsiu was terrified; he knocked
his head and begged for death. Chung-hsien abusively sent him away.
ChTeng-hsiu, in great distress, wished to hang himself, but members
of his household encircled him and prevented it.
When Li Shih heard of the uprising, he locked his gate and wept
until his eyes swelled completely to.
When the censor-in-chiefTs (first) memorial arrived, the chief
minister, originally a man of Wu, 6** w a s s o shocked he was unable to
get out. The secondary minister undertook to substitute for him in
drafting a rescript. Chung-hsien went to the Secretariat and, with a
fierce countenance, said: "The Emperor is thunderously angry; he
will certainly wish to put to death all those who have rebelled.tf The
secondary minister said: nThe gentleman is surely mistaken! The
capital looks to Chiang-nan for the transport of grain by the millions
(of piculs). Now the transport season is at hand, and the area is in
revolt. Properly, lenience and magnanimity should be displayed. If
it is further aroused through stern edicts, with the result that there are
other losses, then who will bear the blame?" Chung-hsien went back
into (the palace) without answering.
The Secretariat minister who was newest in the administration65
alone thought differently. When the rescript was being drafted, he
grasped the memorial from the hand of the secondary minister, took
up a pen, and started to write. But the train of his thoughts suddenly
became very vague, and he was unable to compose a single statement.
Chung-hsien urged him on; but the secondary minister took back the
memorial and wrote: "There has been received a rescript, stating:
TWhen Shun-chTang is brought in under arrest, the court naturally will
deliberate about disposition of him. How can little people, lacking in
knowledge, press in crowds and cry out so as to cause a great clamor?
If they disperse at once, there need not be a thorough investigation*" and
so forth. In general, it clearly indicated that the governor and the
provincial inspector should terminate the matter by means of a lenient
policy.66
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As soon as the censor-in-chief1 s second memorial arrived, there
was received a rescript stating: "The common people have gone so
wild as to form a mob and injure guardsmen."67 There was still no
desire to apply to this the designation of murdering an imperial envoy.
But when the censor-in-chieffs third memorial arrived, it stated: nI
have caught the violent people who incited the trouble, and the area is
submissive.rf Moreover, it included such statements as "none has
escaped the net of heaven" and "public opinion is all aroused. "^8 Chung-
hsien consequently said: "This being the case, then let us no longer
worry about inciting rebellion. " It now happened that the secondary
minister fell ill and died, and the chief minister came forth to take charge
of affairs. He humbly took orders (from Wei Chung-hsien). Thereupon
there was issued an edict about the chief rebels who had escaped the net,
and the commander of the Imperial Guard, TTien Er-keng ffl %$ $
(d. 1628),69 subsequently memorialized about the students. A former
censor jestingly said to a man of Wu who held office in the capital: "Is
ChouLi-pu, then, truly another Lord of Fu-y t t ( ^ i^ / | ] i )?"7 0 This
was because he profoundly hated him.
In Wu, meanwhile, there was wild terror day and night. It was
said that there were going to be pit-burials (of literati) and massacres
(of commoners), and rich families all moved away. In the delibera-
tions of the inner court, it was insistently desired that great trials be
undertaken in the three Wu (i.e., Su-chou, Chfang-chou, and Hu-chou
prefectures), beginning with the students who had spoken out in opposi-
tion. Moreover, guardsmen had reported their names, and they had
already been arrested!
Just at the time when Chung-hsien and his partisans were secretly
plotting in the palace, there was a sudden earthquake.72 A roof orna-
ment over the place where they were sitting fell without any apparent
reason, and two young eunuchs whom (Wei) favored were crushed to
death. In a moment there was a sound like thunder rising from the
northwest. It shook heaven and earth, and black clouds flowed over
confusedly. People1 s dwellings were destroyed to such an extent that
for several miles (li) nothing remained. Great stones hurtled down
from the sky like rain. Men and women died by the tens of thousands;
donkeys, horses, chickens, and dogs all had broken or cracked limbs.
People with smashed skulls or broken noses were strewn about — the
streets were full of them! Gunpowder that had previously been stored
in the Imperial Arsenal (Wang kung chrang)?3 exploded. This alarmed
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elephants, 74 and the elephants ran about wildly, trampling to death an
incalculable number of people.
The court astrologer reported his interpretation of these events as
follows: "In the earth there is tumultuous noise. This is an evil omen
of calamity in the world. When noise gushes forth from within the earth,
the city must be destroyed." He also said: "The reason why the earth
growls is that throughout the empire troops arise to attack one another
and that palace women and eunuchs have brought about great disorder. "
Chung-hsien promptly beat him to death. How far more worthy was this
court astrologer, who though a minor minister was yet able obstinately
to remonstrate about a technical matter, than those who sang praises of
(Wei!s) merits and virtues!
When the calamity subsided, the commander of the Imperial Guard
made further requests about the Wu affair, but Chung-hsien had been
awed by the disaster and ordered that the matter be set aside for the
time being. 75 Yet in the end Shun-chTang died in prison. 76 Till death
he cursed incessantly. When it was produced in a mixed-up group, his
corpse was so mutilated that it could no longer be identified. Even
passers-by were deeply moved.
Further, there was issued an edict secretly ordering the censor-
in-chief immediately to put to death five men including Yen Pfei-wei
and to send others into frontier military service. The education
intendant was also ordered to degrade or dismiss the students, variably.
Their names have been recorded elsewhere. 77 The censor-in-chief,
afraid of inciting another uprising, did not dare carry out the executions
publicly. He turned the victims in fetters over to the supervisor of
defenses, who, with tears flowing freely, beheaded them in front of the
guardsmenT s compound. 78
One day before the executions there were again fierce winds and
heavy rains, as when Shun-chTang was arrested. Trees were uprooted
and stalks of grain were killed. The water of the Grand Lake (TTai-hu)
was churned up so that it inundated people's thatched huts, and those
who drowned were innumerable. The Yangtze River overflowed for
several days and nights. People all said this had been brought about by
(heavenTs) resentment. 79
Knowing that Chung-hsien and ChTeng-hsiu, when plotting to arrest
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and put to, death all the various partisans, actually gave first considera-
tion to Wu, guardsmen in advance gave several thousand (taels of) silver
to the commander of the Imperial Guard in the hope of making the arrests
one after another and in the expectation that, after obtaining the commis-
sions, they might make extortionate demands without restraint. But
beginning with the affair in Wu, the wrath of heaven and the anger of men
reacted upon and responded to one another. Chung-hsien became cautious
and the guardsmen warned one another not to dare to go south. The
imperial warrant for Huang Tsun-su being already lost, there was
enacted nothing more than an arrest by the governor and the provincial
inspector.80
All over the empire it was said that the attack in Wu was comparable
to the bludgeoning (of the tyrannical ancient Emperor Chfin Shih Huang,
attempted) at Po-lang ^^ 8*

NOTES
1. Chu Yu-chiao, b. 1605, reigned under the nien-hao TTien-chfi.
See article "Chu Yu-chiaoTt by George A. Kennedy in A. W. Hummel, ed.,
Eminent Chinese of the ChTing Period (1644-1912) (2 vols . , Washington,
1943-1944).
2. See article "Wei Chung-hsien" by George A, Kennedy in A, W.
Hummel, op. cit . , and Ming-shih (Tfung-wen edition), 305. 18a-28a.
(Mng-shih is hereinafter cited as MS.) Wei was degraded and banished
after the death of Hsi Tsung in 1627; and, when further punishment was
being planned, he finally committed suicide.
3. The best modern survey of the late Mng partisan struggle is
Hsi eh Kuo-chen, Ming ChTing chih chi tang-she ytln-tung kTao (Shanghai,
Commercial Press , 1934). Also see Ch'en Ting, ed., Tung-lin lieh-
chuan (26 chtian, 1711 edition); Tung-lin shu-ytian chih (22 chtlan, 1882
edition); and Wen Ping, Hsien-po chih-shih (Chieh-ytieh shan-fang hui-
chTao edition). For a survey of the extensive Chinese literature on this
subject, see Hsieh Kuo-chen, Wan Mng shih-chi kTao (20 chttan, Peking,
1932)-
4. Chu I-ehttn, b. 1563, reigned under the nien-hao Wan-li.
5. For biographical data about Chou Shun-ch!ang, see MS 245.5a-
6b* Wen Ping, Ku-su ming-hsien hstt-chi (Chia-hsti tsTung-pien edition),
p. 7a; Mao Ching-ch!ih, Tung-lin tTung-nan tu (Yen-hua-tung tfang hsiao-
pTin edition), 1.26a-26b, 2.30b-32a; and Yin Hsien-chTen, Chou Chung-
chieh kung nien-pTu (Chieh-ytteh shan-fang hui-chTao edition).
6. See Wen Ping, Hsien-po chih-shih, 2. 2lb; Chin Jih-sheng, Chou
Shun-chTang chuan, in Sung-tTien lu-pi (24 chttan, preface dated 1629),
8. la . While serving in the Mnistry of Civil Service, Chou once rebuked
a subordinate for offering him a dose of ginseng and insisted upon paying
for it. See Chi Liu-ch'i, Mng-chi pei-ltleh (Kuo-hstteh chi-pen tsTung-
shu edition), vol. 1, p, 37 (chttan 2).
7. MS245.5a-6b.
8. Yin Hsien-chfen, op. ci t . , pp. l l a - l l b ; Tung-lin shu-yttan chih,
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22.37b, The imperial rescript that ordered Chouf s arrest did classify
him as an Eastern Forest partisan. See Hsi Tsung shih-lu (1940 photo-
lithographic edition), 63.35b. But two sources report that in 1624,
when partisans of Wei Chung-hsien prepared a blacklist of Eastern
Forest partisans called Tung-lin tien-chiang lu, ChouTs name (and he
considered this shameful) was omitted. See Chang Shih-wei, Chou
Li-pu chi-shih (see note 15), p. 19b; and Jen-pien shu-ltieh (see note
30). Almost all of the extant texts of Tung-lin tien-chiang lu neverthe-
less include Chours name. See Chu Tan, "Tung-lin tien-chiang lu
kTao-iff in Kuo-li Chung-shan ta-hstleh wen-shih-hsttehyen-chiu so
ytleh-kTan, vol. 2, no. 1 (October, 1933), pp. 33-65.
9. See Pei-ching jen-wen k'o-hstteh yen-chiu so tsyang-shu mu-lu
(8 vols., Peking, 1938), vol. 6, p. 19a, where this collection is
identified as a manuscript of the Ming period. It is now in the posses-
sion of the Academia Sinica Institute of History and Philology in Taiwan.
10. The modern scholar Hsieh Kuo-chen (Wan Ming shih-chi kTao,
5.18a) attributes authorship of this work to Chin Jih-sheng; but this
appears to be an assumption, not a considered judgment, derived from
the attribution of editorship of the item to Chin in Pi-tsTe tsTung-shuo.
Inclusion of the work in Sung-tTien lu-pi does not seem of itself to be
satisfactory evidence of Chinfs authorship, since many items not of
Chinfs authorship are included in this compilation. Appended to the
Sung-tien lu-pi text is an uninformative postface signed merely with
the pseudonym "the lonely man of Wu (Jf-̂ /̂ Ĵ f-*- )••" The seventeenth-
century Su-chou author Ku Ling, however, in a biographical notice of
his friend Wen Chen-heng that has been published in Ku-su ming-hsien
hou-chi (I-hai tsyung-pien edition), pp. 23b-24b, lists KTai-tu ch'uan-
hsin among the published works of Wen. Wen was among the close
friends of Chou Shun-ch'angj one of his nephews married one of Choufs
daughters. See Su-chou fu chih (160 chttan, 1824 edition), 90.30b-31a
(biography of Wen Ch'eng). And since several independent texts (e. g.,
those of Yin Hsien-ch'en and "the wave minister of the five lakes")
confirm the fact of Wen's participation in the demonstration against
ChouTs arrest, it is clear that he could have written a detailed eye-
witness account of it. Strong support for the contention that Wen actually
did write KTai-tu ch'uan-hsin derives from the considerations that
(1) Wen is the only "student" participant identified therein, and (2) KTai-
tu ch'uan-hsin credits Wen with long and heroic statements addressed
to the authorities over the promulgation ceremony, whereas (3) no
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independent text goes beyond mere mention of Wen as one of several
persons who addressed the authorities, and (4) Wen was in fact not
among the five students who were subsequently degraded for having
been ringleaders in the demonstration. It appears impossible, never-
theless, clearly to identify Wen with "the lonely man of Wurf of the
Sung-tTien lu-pi text.
11. Yin Hsien-chfen, a resident of Su-chou, compiled Chou Chung-
chieh kung nien-p'u (see note 5). Yin was among Chou Shun-chTangfs
close friends and a participant in the 1626 demonstration, although his
biography of Chou does not give a detailed chronicle of the incident.
When the Ming dynasty fell, he starved himself to death. One of his
sons married one of Chouf s daughters. See Su-chou fu chih, 90.32b;
Hstl Tzu, Hsiao-tTien chi-chuan (1887 edition), 49.5b; and Mao Ching-
ch'ih, op. cit., 3. 7b-8a.
12. Chu Tsu-wen, a student of Su-chou, was indebted to Chou for
help in obtaining official recognition of the virtues of his widowed
mother. He was in Chours company almost without a break from the
time of ChouTs arrest until his departure from Su-chou. Chu escorted
Chou out of the city, then preceded him to Peking, and ruined his
health trying to raise money for ChouTs cause in the north. After ChouTs
death, Chu fell ill and soon died. During his illness he compiled a
diary for the period beginning with Chou!s arrest, Pei-hsing jih-pTu,
included in Chih-pu-tsu chai tsTung-shu, series 21. For biographical
data, see Chin Jih-sheng, Chu Wen-hstleh, in Sung-tTien lu-pi, 22.26a.-
27b; Su-chou fu chih, 92. 25a-25b; and MS 245.7a.
13. Yang Tfing-shu, who attained the degree of chtl-jen and was
first on the list in the provincial examination of 1630, was a man of
great literary renown, a founder of the Ying-she literary society
and of the massive Fu-she ("antiquity-restoration society") literary-
political movement into which it grew, and a famous teacher who is
said to have taught two thousand identified students. He supported his
friend Chou Shun-chTang during the 1626 demonstration and wrote a
brief account of it entitled Ch'tfan Wu chi-ltieh, included in Ching-t'o
i-shih. After the fall of the Ming dynasty he became a recluse. Finally
caught by the Manehus and ordered to adopt the Manchu hair style, he
refused and was put to death. For biographical and background inform-
ation, see MS 267.11a-l2a; Su-chou fu chih, 90.13a-14a; Wu-hsien chih
(1933 edition), 69A.14b-15a; Chu Tan, "Ming-chi nan Ying-she kTao,ff
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in Kuo-hsUeh chi-kTan, vol 2, no. 3(September, 1930), pp. 541-588;
and entry entitles "Chang PTun in A.W. Hummel, op. cit.
14. See Chin Jih-sheng, Chou Shun-chTang chuan. Whether or
not Chin witnessed the 1626 incident is not specifically stated.
15. Chang Shih-wei, a resident of Su-chou and a close friend
of Chou, is said to have done much to stir up indignation over Chou's
arrest; it appears almost certain that he witnessed the demonstration
of which he wrote vividly in Chou Li-pu cho-shih, printed in Sung-tfien
lu-pi, 8. 4a-21b. For biographical data see Su-chou fu-chih, 92. 22b-
23a; Chu I-tsun, Ming-shih tsung (100 chUan, 1705 edition), 70. 4a-4b.
Chang attained the chU-jen degree in 1612.
16. Yao Hsi-meng was a chin-shih of 1619, a supporter of the
Eastern Forest Party, a nephew of Wen Chen-heng, and a life-long
associate of Wenrs older brother Wen Chen-meng (1547-1636). After
an influential career in the Han-lin yttan at Peking, he returned home
in mourning in 1625 and was soon erased from the rolls. He was
one of Chou Shun-chfangTs most intimate friends; but he was absent
from Su-chou at the time of Chou?s arrest (see TsTai Shih-shun,
Li Chung-ta pei-tai chi-lUeh [Ching-t'o i-shih edition] , pp. la-lb)
and appears to have remained absent until after Chou's departure,
for Chou hoped to meet him enroute (see second letter from Chou
to Yao in Chou Chung-chieh kung chin-ytl chi [Chieh-ylleh shan-fang
hui-ch'ao edition, 4 chllanj, 2. 18a-18b). His account of the 1626
incident, K'ai-tu shih-mo, appears in his collected works, Yao
Meng-chang ch'Uan-chi (54 chUan, Ch'ung-chen edition), in the section
Kung-huai chi (6 chUan), 3. l la-16b. It was republished, with minor
variations and without attribution of authorship, in Wu-hsien chih,
78. 21b-23a, ascribed to an early gazetteer of the K'ang-hsi period
(1662-1722). This account differs substantially fron KTai-tu ch'uan-
hsin, but in many places the wording is identical.
17. Tyi-ch'ichi-lUeh appears in Sung-t'ien lu-pi,21. 22a-34b (listed
in the table of contents as Tfi-ch'i shu but in chUan 21 as above), and in
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Pi-tsTe ts?ung-shuo, vol. 13, pp. 9a- 14b. "The wave minister of the
five lakes" remains unidentified, but inclusion of this item in Sung-tien
lu-pi would appear to give it some authority, and perhaps the authority
of an eyewitness account, considering its vivid detail. (Subsequent
citations are of the Sung-t'ien lu-pi text.)
18. Official documents relating to the Su-chou incident include the
following:
(1) Memorial by Mao I-lu and Hsli Chi abstracted in HTSL (i. e. ,
Hsi-tsung shih-lu), 65. 7b-8a (under date 1626.4 ^j.)
(2) Memorial by Mao I-lu and Hsll Chi abstracted in HTSL 65.16a-
17a (1626.4);
(3) Memorial by Chang Kuo-tung abstracted in HTSL 65.17a-17b
(1626.4);
(4) Memorial by Mao I-lu abstracted in HTSL 68. 25a-25b (1626.6a);
(5) Memorial by Mao I-lu quoted in Li Hsttn-chih, San-chTao yeh-chi
(Ching-tfo i-shih edition), 3A. 36a-36b (identical with #4?); and
(6) Hsti hsttn-an chieh-tTieh (Memorial by HstI Chi, dated 1626.6)
*n Yu-man lou tsTung-shu, vol. 1.
19. Wei Ta-chung, a man of Chia-shan district in Chekiang, south
of Su-chou, was a chin-shih of 1616, and served thereafter in the capital
as messenger and supervising secretary, becoming in 1624 chief
supervising secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Civil Service. Closely
allied with the Eastern Forest Party, he was one of the most outspoken
critics of Wei Chung-hsien and his henchmen. Consequently, he was
among the famous "six heroes" who were arrested and put to death in
prison in 1625. See MS 244.15b-19a and entry entitled "Yang Lien" in
A. W. Hummel, op. cit.
20. Cf. HTSL 56. 8b-9a, under date 1625. 7 £& Ni was one of
the most active of Wei Chung-hsienTs adherents. After he had previously
caused the death of the censor Hsia Chih-ling J t . ^ , Chou Shun-chrang
said publicly that Ni one day would have to pay with his own life for Hsiars.
Ni consequently hated Chou. See MS 306.18b-19a, 245.5b; and Yang-chou
fuchih (73 chilan, 1810 edition), 39. 22b.
21. Cf. Su-chou fu chih, 72. 20a; Wu-hsien chih, 63. 30b.
22. Li Shih entered palace service in 1578. Most sources describe
him as being illiterate (e. g., Wen Ping, Hsien-po chih-shih, 2. 2la),
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but his fellow-eunuch Liu Jo-yii testified that he had studied the orthodox
literature and was a companion-reader to the crown prince under Shen
Tsung (Cho-chung chih [24 chiian, Cheng-chtieh lou tsTung-kTo editio^ >
15.19a-20a), Under Hsi Tsung, he seems to have lost favor, for he was
not originally a partisan of Wei Chung-hsien, and in 1621 he was sent out
to be superviser of textile manufactures in Su-chou and Hang-chou. All
sources agree that he was coarse and common; but it has been suggested
that the Eastern Forest partisan Huang Tsun-su connived with Li in the
hope of using him as a tool by means of which the partisans might have
palace support in an attempt to overthrow Wei. In the end, however, Li
was branded a Wei Chung-hsien partisan. After the death of Hsi Tsung
he was demoted to be an inspector of troops at Nanking, where he died
of old age. Cf. Wu Ying-chi, ChTi-chen liang-chTao po-fu lu (Kuei-chTih
hsien-che i-shu edition), 3. 5b-6a; MS 245.12a-15b. Regarding the post
of superviser of textile manufactures, see MS 74. 26b; Liu Jo-ytt, op. cit.,
16.10b-lla.
23. Chou ChTi-yttan was a long-time adherent of the Eastern Forest
Party. He was appointed governor of the southern metropolitan area
(Ying-tfien and surrounding prefectures) in 1623. See MS 245. la-3a.
24. This essay is reproduced in full in Chou Chung-chieh kung chin-
yti chi, 3. la-2b. Abbreviated versions are found in Chang Shih-wei,
op. cit., p. 6b; and in the biography of Chou Ch!i-ytian in Wu Ying-chi,
Hsi-chTao chung-chieh ssu-ch'en chuan (Ching-tfo i-shih edition), pp. 22a-
23a.
25. Mao I-lu, a native of Sui-an district in Chekiang, served as
governor of the southern metropolitan area from the second lunar month
of 1625 until the tenth lunar month of 1626, when he was promoted to be
vice-minister of war. See Ming tu-fu nien-piao (in Er-shih-wu shih pu-
pien,) p. 134.
26. This was Chu T'ung-mengj|L^^ (chin-shih 1610), a long-time
opponent of the Eastern Forest Party (e. g., see MS 243.10b-lla) and
a favorite of Wei Chung-hsien, who at this time was an official of the
(Chekiang?) Provincial Investigation Office. See Li Hsttn-chih, op. cit.,
3A. la-lb. (The text here reads ^^:^%}i ; Li Hstin-chih more
specifically identifies Chu as $j>i*& 1i% •) The Ming-shih is apparently
mistaken in identifying him as vice-commissioner of the Provincial
Administration Office (MS 245. 2b: V %&
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27. Chou Tsung-chien, a man of Wu district and a chin-shih
of 1613, was a censor and one of the most outspoken and independent
Eastern Forest partisans during the early part of Hsi TsungTs reign.
Late in 1623 he went home in mourning. In 1625 he was erased from
the rolls, and a full recovery of his alleged bribery-loot was ordered.
See MS 245. 7b-lib,
28. Miao Ch!ang-chfi was a resident of Ch'ang-chou prefecture
near Su-chou and a chin-shih of 1613. Serving in the Han-lin yttan, he
supported Yang LienTs famous attack on Wei Chung-hsien in 1624; the
eunuch thought he had actually drafted Yangfs memorial. Subsequently
Mao was erased from the rolls. See MS 245.3a-5a.
29. Kao PTan-lung, one of the most eminent philosophers of the
late Ming era, was a native of Wu-hsi district in ChTang-chou pre-
fecture and one of the founders of the Eastern Forest Academy at
Wu-hsi. A chin-shih of 1589, he had barely got started on an official
career when he became entangled in partisan wrangling and had to
retire. Recalled in 1621, he became censor-in-chief but late in 1624
departed on leave of absence. When the order for his arrest arrived
in 1626, Kao drowned himself. See MS 243.15b-19b.
30. Li Ying-sheng, another native of ChTang-chou prefecture,
attained the chin-shin degree in 1616. A censor and another outspoken
critic of Wei Chung-hsien, Li was erased from the rolls in 1625. See
MS 245.15b-18b. A secondary source reports that when Li was arrested
the people of ChTang-chou rose up to attack the guardsmen in much the
same manner as the people of Su-chou demonstrated on behalf of Chou
Shun-chTang. See Jen-pien shu-ltteh in Huang Ytt, Pi-hstteh lu (Chih-pu-
tsu chai tsTung-shu, series 13, edition,) 2.40a-44a; quoted in Li Hstln-
chih> op« c i t . , 3A. 36b-39b. (An abbreviated version of Jen-pien shu-
r&eh appears in Ching-tTo i-shih. Whether or not the work was actually
written by Huang Ytlf as is indicated in the Ching-t
To i-shih text, is not
clear. See Hsieh Kuo-chen, Wan Ming shih-chi kTao, 5.13b-15a.) But
an eyewitness report indicates that ChTang-chou authorities, having
learned of the incident at Su-chou and knowing that the people of Ch'ang-
chou were in a very disturbed mood, prevented trouble by not permitt-
ing the public to attend the ceremony at which the order of arrest was
promulgated. See TsTai Shih-shun, op. cit., p, 2b.
31. Huang Tsun-su was a native of Yli-yao district of Chekiang
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province, A chin-shih of 1616, he became a censor and a vigorous
opponent of Wei Chung-hsien and was erased from the rolls in 1625.
He was the father of the great scholar Huang Tsung-hsi. See MS
245.I2a-15b.
32. Cf. HTSL 63. 35a-36a (under date 1626, 2)
33. Cf. HTSL 63. 20b-21a (under date 1626. 2)
34. Tsrui Chfeng-hsiu was one of the most vicious of Wei Chung-
hsien^ henchmen. As a censor, he was attacked for corruption by Kao
PTan-lung and then in self-defense threw himself on the mercy of Wei
and became his adopted son. See MS 306.15b-18a.
35. The five men whose arrests were ordered at this time were
Chou Chfi-ytlan, Chou Shun-chfang, Kao Pfan-lung, Li Ying-sheng,
and Huang Tsun-su. The arrests of Chou Tsung-chien and Miao
ChTang-chTi had been ordered previously. With the exception of Kao
Pfan-lung, who committed suicide, all of these men subsequently were
put to death in prison.
36. Most sources agree that LiTs memorial was prepared in his
name by order of Wei Chung-hsien on a blank memorial sheet bearing
only Li!s seal. The last Ming Emperor satisfied himself that such
had been the case from an inspection of the overlapping black and red
ink on the original document. It was apparently by permitting use of
his name in this manner that Li was himself able to escape Wei's wrath
at reports of LiTs connivance with Huang Tsun-su. See MS 245. la-3a;
Li Hstin-chih, op. cit., 3A. 35b-36a; Wen Ping, Hsien-po chih-shih,
2. 2la; Liu Jo-yti, op. cit., 15.19a-20a; and Wen Ping, Lieh-huang
hsiao-shih, chttan 1, in Mng-chi pai-shih chTu-pien (Kuo-hstieh chi-
pen tsTung-shu edition), vol. 1, pp. 12-13, It would appear that the
impeachment, whether or not actually submitted by Li, represented
WeiTs wishes rather than Lifs; for all of the men named had offended
Wei, whereas not all can be proved to have offended Li.
37. Guardsmen arrived in Su-chou to arrest Chou Tsung-chien on
the fifth day of the third lunar month (April 1) of 1626. Their edict
was promulgated on the tenth day (April 6), and they departed with Chou
on the twelfth day (April 8). On the fifteenth day (April 11) guardsmen
arrived to arrest Chou Shun-chfang. See Chang Shih-wei, op. cit., p. 8b.
Chou Shun-ch?ang had contributed money to both Chou Tsung-chien and
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Mao ChTang-chTi when they were arrested, using funds he had obtained
by pawning his official gowns and hats. See Yin Hsien-chTen, op. cit.,
p. 15b.
38. ChTen Wen-jui had earlier studied under Chou Shun-chfang.
See Su-chou fu chih, 73.11b-l2a; Yin Hsien-ch'en, op. cit., p. 16b;
and Chi Liu-chTi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 37.
39. This inscription, reading f'small-cloud roost", J ^ ^ | - , was
inscribed and signed by Chou on behalf of the Lung-shu monastery
outside Su-chou, founded by the mpnk Kuang ChTuan>^ j ^ and given its
name by Chou himself. See Su-chou fu chih, 41.30a-30b, 120. Ilb-l2a;
TTi-chTi chi-ltieh, p. 27b; Yao Hsi-meng, KTai-tu shih-mo, p. l ib;
Yin Hsien-chTen, op. cit., p. 16b; Jen-pien shu-ltieh, p. 41b; and Chi
Liu-chri, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 38.
40. Throughout this text, the term "student" (chu-sheng) refers to
a person who at some time had been admitted to a government school
at the district level or above. It corresponds generally to the term
hsiu-tsTai of other periods and designated a personTs status in the
hierarchy of government degrees, not necessarily indicating that he
was a young man at the moment studying in a school. Of the various
students identified in this and related texts, many were of Chou Shun-
chrangTs generation and thus not youths.
41. This text identifies the guardsmen1 s compound as the shih-shu
literally "the envoy's yamen" (?). Other sources identify it
as "the western investigation office" (hsi ch'a-yttan). See Chang Shih-
wei, op. cit., p. 10a; Yin Hsien-chTen, op. cit., p. 18b; and TTi-chTi
chi-ltteh, p. 28b. "The western investigation office" was primarily
used as a headquarters for the CensorateTs inspector of salt production
during his visits. See Su-chou fu chih, 22.10a.
42. A total of sixty men had been sent out by the Imperial Guard,
led by the battalion commanders Chang Ying-lung j£/4|^| and Wen
Chih-ping st <i /§ . See Chi Liu-chTi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 37; T'i-chTi
chi-ltieh, p. 27a; and Yao Hsi-meng, Kfai-tu shih-mo, p. l ib.
43. For details of this incident, which occurred in 1483, see Su-
chou fu chih, 145. 28b-30a; and MS 304.18b-19a, 182. la-8a. Wang
Chih was second in the succession of four great eunuch despots of the
Ming dynasty, which culminated with Wei Chung-hsien. See MS 304.13b-
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17a.
44. See MS 163. 2b-3a. Wang Chen was the first great eunuch
despot of the Ming dynasty. See MS 304. 7b-10a.
45. Cf. Chung-kuo jen-ming ta tzTu-tien (Shanghai, 1934), p. 1761.
46. Cf. Herbert A. Giles, A Chinese Biographical Dictionary
(London and Shanghai, 1898), no. 1645,
47. The sources disagree about the number of guardsmen killed
in this uprising. One man named Li Kuo-chu^ i§j \i i s definitely
reported to have died. See HTSL 65.16a-17a; Yao Hsi-meng, KTai-tu
shih-mo, pp. l la , 13b; and Jen-pien shu-ltteh, p. 42b. Chin Jih-sheng
in Wu-jen chuan (Sung-tTien lu-pi, 22. 28a-30b; reproduced in chiton 4
of Chou Chung-chieh kung chin-yti chi) says two men died, and this
assertion is repeated in MS 305. 23a.
48. In their second memorial, Mao I-lu and Hstl Chi blamed the
guardsmen for the three-day delay, without which they said the incident
would not have occurred. See HTSL 65.16a-17a.
49. Wang Chieh, a resident of Wu district, became a chtl-jen in
1639. For brief biographical data see MLao Ching-chTih, op. cit., 3.8b-
9a.
50. Liu Ytt-i, also a resident of Wu district, was an intimate
friend of Chou Shun-ch'ang. See Mao Ching-chTih, op. cit., 3. 7a-
7b.
51. The Tung chTang was a eunuch-controlled agency which, in
cooperation with the Imperial Guard, provided a kind of secret service
for the Emperor. See MS 74. 26a.
52. Sha Shun-chTen, a resident of Su-chou, was renowned for his
filial piety. See Su-chou fu chih, 92. 27a-27b; and Mao Ching-chTih,
op. cit., 3.7b.
53. See Mao Ching-ch'ih, op. cit., 3.8a-8b.
54. Wu Er-chang was an uncle of Chou Shun-chTungrs wife. See
Chi Liu-chTi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 37.
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55. Still other students who are said to have participated in this
demonstration include: Yang Tfing-shu (see note 13); Liu Shu j|?J fl^
(d. 1647, chin-shih 1643; see Su-chou fu chih, 90. 2lb-22a; and Hsti
Tzu, Hsiao-tTien chi-chuan, 49.19b-20a); Cheng Fu-chiao &p$Lj[L (chtt-
jen 1630, later one of the founders of the "antiquity-restoration society";
see Su-chou fu chih, 99.41b-42a); Yin Hsien-ch?en himself; Ytian Cheng
"%.$L ( s e e Gnu I-tsun, op. cit. , 76.24b); Chu Wei %.f%i (another member
of the "antiquity-restoration society"; see Su-chou fu chih, 99.42a; and
Chu I-tsun, op. cit., 76.4a); and Wang I-ching^J -^ f . See Chi Liu-
cit., vol. 1, p. 38.
56. Hsti ChiTs memorial generally substantiates this description
of the activities of these five commoners. According to him, Yen
P7ei-wei, who was then thirty-four years old and was chief leader of
the uprising, passed around incense and swore oaths with the crowd.
Ma Chi eh struck a watchman7 s rattle and shouted summonses. Shen
Yang also incited the crowd. Yang Nien-ju and Chou Wen-ytian bared
their arms, cried out wildly, and fought with the guardsmen. See
Hsti hstm-an chieh-tTieh. Chin Jih-sheng notes that Yen PTei-wei
came of a mercantile family. See Wu-jen chuan, p. 28a. Two days
before the promulgation ceremony, Yen PTei-wei had attacked a
district functionary who had made abusive remarks about Chou Shun-
chTang. See Yin Hsien-ch7en, op. cit., p. 17b.
57. Cf. TTi-chTi chi-ltieh, pp. 30b-31a; Yao Hsi-meng, K7ai-tu
shih-mo, pp. 13b-14a; and Yin Hsien-chTen, op. cit., p. 19b. Jen-
pien shu-ltieh, p. 43a, says that the crowd, after disposing of this new
group of guardsmen, proposed traveling about to find and kill the eunuch
Li Shih and to wipe out the family of the chief Secretariat minister, Ku
Ping-chTien>i! j | if[% , but was deterred by Yen P
fei-wei. Hsti Chi says
that when these guardsmen arrived and made extravagant demands at
the courier station, the courier station attendant Yang Fang -%%$
complained and shouted wildly for help; that the butcher Tai Yung
raised a clamor over the guardsmen7s attempts to dictate prices
in the marketplace; that Hstt Er-ch7eng I ^ J ^ ^ > Chi Mao-hstin i$f]% »
and Ting K7uei J ^ thereupon summoned Yen P7ei-wei and others from
the city; and that the crowd reached the courier station in a boat provided
by the courier station attendant Tsou Ying-chen $fjfi[^ See Hsti hstln-
an chieh-t7ieh.
58. This memorial is abstracted in HTSL 65.7b-8a.
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59. The thirteen commoners who were arrested were Yen PTei-
wei, Ma Chi eh, Shen Yang, Yang Nien-ju, and Chou Wen-ytlan, all
subsequently put to death; Wu Shih-hsin Jj*. H^ ]\ (active in the attack
at the guardsmen1 s compound), Liu Ying-wen ^J/^f X (active at the
guardsmenrs compound), Ting KTuei (active both at the guardsmenTs
compound and at the courier station), Hstl Er-chTeng, and Chi Mao-
hstln, all subsequently banished to frontier military service; Tsou Ying-
chen and Yang Fang, both subsequently given sixty blows with the
bastinado; and the butcher Tai Yung, who died after his arrest. See
Hsti hsun-an chieh-tTieh; and HTSL 68. 25a-25b.
60. Cf. Yao Hsi-meng, KTai-tu shih-mo, p. 14b: "He said: TThese
men all took the lead because of selfish motives; there was no public
indignation.T Since Li Shihfs memorial had included the statement that
the people of Wu were gnashing their teeth in profound anger, he avoided
ridicule in this way. "
61. This is apparently an earlier name for the ChTing dynasty
Chiang f^\ gate, a great gate in the Su-chou city wall near the Wu
district yamen. See the map of Su-ehou in Su-chou fu chih, vol. 1,
pp. 2b-3a.
62. Most sources agree that Chou was escorted out of Su-chou
during the second watch of the night of the twenty-sixth day of the third
lunar month (April 22, 1626). See Yin Hsien-ch'en, op. cit., p. 2la;
and TTi-chTi chi-ltieh, p. 31b. But Chu Tsu-wen (op. cit., p. 9a) and
Chou himself in a letter to Yao Hsi-meng (Chou Chung-chieh kung
chin-ytt chi, 2.18a-18b) state that he departed in the second watch on
the twenty-fifth day (April 21). He arrived at Peking on the twenty-
fourth day of the fourth lunar month (May 19). See Yin Hsien-chfen,
op. cit., pp. 2la-2lb. Before leaving Su-chou, Chou had considered
and rejected the idea of suicide. See Yin Hsien-chTen, op. cit., pp. 20a
ff.; and T'i-ch'i chi-ltieh, p. 31a.
63. The chief Secretariat minister at this time was Ku Ping-ch!ien
% h (ca- 1550-1630, chin-shih 1595), whose home was in KTun-shan
district, Su-chou prefecture. He retired in 1627 and was erased from
the rolls in 1628 after the fall of Wei Chung-hsien. In 1629 the citizens
of KTun-shan in an outburst of rage burned and plundered his home,
forcing him to flee and spend his last days elsewhere. See MS 306.11a-
14a.
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64. The secondary minister at this time was Ting Shao-shih
(1567-1626, chin^shih 1607) of Kuei-ch?ih district in modem Anhwei
province. See Kuei-ehfih hsien chih (45 chtian, 1883 edition), 21,4a-
6b.
65. This was Feng Ch'tian >$,ft (1595-1672, chin-shih 1613),
who was among the most venal of Wei Chung-hsienTs henchmen and
subsequently served under the Manchus. See Shun-tTien fu chih
(131 chtian, 1884 edition), 105. 31a-33a; Cho-chou chih (23 chtian,
1765 edition), 14. 24a; and biographical notice by Tu Lien-che in A. W.
Hummel, op. cit.
66. Cf. HTSL 65. 7b-8a.
67. Cf. HTSL 65.16a-17a.
68. A third memorial from Mao I-lu is not recorded in HTSL
until the intercalated sixth month (68. 25a-25b); it merely reports legal
action taken against the leaders of the uprising for imperial confirmation
and does not include the statements cited here. A Tfthird memorialfT
by Mao I-lu is quoted in Li Hstln-chih, op. ci t . , 3A. 36a-36b, together
with a reference to an edict about chief rebels who had escaped the
net; but this quotation also lacks the statements cited here.
69. Tfien Er-keng was an intimate adherent of Wei Chung-hsien
and was given command of the Imperial Guard in 1624. He was in
charge of the subsequent persecutions and received many honors and
rewards, but after the overthrow of Wei Chung-hsien he was put to
death. See MS 306.40a-40b.
70. Fu-ytl is the name of an ancient principality of small historical
significance located north of China proper. The passage in this text
obviously is intended to indicate some rebel who threatened real danger
to ChinaTs security. It may therefore be a reference to the homo-
phonous Fu-ytiijgf.^ , one of three Mongol units on China?s northern
border that harassed the frontier intermittently throughout the Ming
period. See MS 328.8a-14a. But it is most likely an oblique reference
to the great Manchu chieftain Nurhaci, who during the historical era
dealt with in this paper was steadily encroaching on Chinafs northeastern
terri tories. See biographical notice in A. W. Hummel, op. cit.
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71. "After the peopleTs uprising, people all were afraid of
disaster. There even were some who had previously contributed
money (for Chouf s cause) and now hurriedly sought to erase their
names from the list of contributors.rr Chu Tsu-wen, op. cit., p. 44a.
72. The catastrophe in Peking on the sixth day of the fifth lunar
month (May 31) of 1626 is described in detail in a single-chtian work
entitled TTien-pien ti-chfao, which appears in Chieh-ytteh shan-fang
hui-chTao, in Chih-hai, in Tse-ku chai chTung-ch?ao, in Pi-tsTe ts'ung-
shuo, and in Huang Ytt, op. cit., in the latter case under the title
TTien-pien tsa-chi. It is attributed only to TTa visitor in Yen" /Jf % ,
who Hsieh Kuo-chen (Wan Ming shih-chi kTao, 5.13b-15a) thinks may
be Huang Ytt. Further data regarding the event can be found in HTSL
66.6b ff. It is reported that 537 persons died.
73. The Imperial Arsenal was operated by eunuchs. See MS 74. 26a.
74. Elephants were maintained at Peking by special troops under
the Imperial Guard. See MS 76. 8b.
75. Because of the calamity, punishments were suspended through-
out the fifth lunar month, but they were resumed in the following month.
See Chi Liu-chTi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 39.
76. Chou died in prison on the seventeenth day of the sixth lunar
month (July 10) of 1626. See Chang Shih-wei, op. cit., p. 13b.
77. The degraded students, whose names actually are not recorded
anywhere in this text, were Wang Chi eh, Liu Ytt-i, Wang Ching-kao,
Yin Hsien-chfen, and Sha Shun-chfen. All were restored after the
overthrow of Wei Chung-hsien. See Chi Liu-chTi, op. cit., vol. 1,
p. 39; and TTi-chTi chi-ltteh, p. 33a.
78. These five men were put to death in the seventh lunar month
(August 22-September 20) of 1626. The people of Su-chou later buried
them on the grounds of a temple that had been erected in honor of Wei
Chung-hsien by Mao I-lu; and it is said that in 1629 the head of Wei
Chung-hsien was brought there and offered in sacrifice to the spirits
of the five men. See Chin Jih-sheng, Sung-tTien lu-pi, 22.30b-35a;
Yao Hsi-meng, KTai-tu shih-mo, p. 15b; and MS 245. 7a. Contem-
poraries considered that Su-chou was fortunate to escape more extensive
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punishments and gave friends at court credit for restraining Wei Chung-
hsienfs fury to such an extent. See Yang TTing-shu, op. cit«
79. Several sources report other peculiar phenomena. It was
said that Ni Wen-huan was visited in broad daylight by the spirit of
Chou Shun-chTang. See TTi-chTi chi-ltieh, p. 14a; and Chin Jih-sheng,
Wu-jen chuan, p. 30a. It was also said that Mao I-lu died very suddenly
when the ghosts of the five commoners similarly called on him. See
TTi-chfi chi-rueh, p. 33a; and Chi Liu-chTi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 39.
80. Cf. MS245.l2a-15b.
81. Cf. Shih-chi (TTung-wen edition), 55. la-2a.
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